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A TALE OF TWO STANDARDS:
WHY WYOMING COURTS SHOULD APPLY
THE ACTUAL SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
STANDARD WHEN REVIEWING WORKERS’
COMPENSATION CASES
Michael C. Duff *
I. Introduction
In Wyoming, as in almost every other state in the United States, facts in
contested workers’ compensation cases are developed within an administrative
agency.1 Thus, common workers’ compensation issues such as whether an injury
is causally related to work,2 the degree of a workers’ disability,3 an employee’s

* Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. B.A. 1991, West Chester
University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School. J. R. Boyd, Sam Kalen, George Santini,
Richard Seamon, and David Torrey provided helpful comments on early drafts of this article. All
errors are mine.
1
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vi) (2017). For a succinct summary reflecting the
universal use of administrative agencies in workers’ compensation adjudication see David B. Torrey,
The Workers’ Compensation Judge and Finality of Fact-Finding Among States: Introduction and Tables,
National Association of Workers’ Compensation Judiciary Comparative Adjudication Systems
Project, at tbl. 1, 2 (2012), http://www.davetorrey.info. Since Judge Torrey’s summary, Tennessee,
possessing one of the last two court-based systems, has transitioned to an administrative agencybased system. Id. Only Alabama remains as a court-based system. Id.; see also David B. Torrey,
Master or Chancellor? The Workers’ Compensation Judge and Adjudicatory Power, 32 J. Nat. Assoc. of
Admin. Law Judiciary 23, 35 (2012).
2
In Wyoming, “injury” means “any harmful change in the human organism other than
normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or
controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in places where the employer’s business
requires an employee’s presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident
to the business.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi).
3

Id. §§ 27-14-404–405.
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average wage at the time of injury,4 whether an employee provided timely notice
of injury,5 whether a worker is an employee within the meaning of the Act,6 and
whether an injury occurred on an employer’s premises,7 are initially decided by
an administrative agency.8 Wyoming’s system is somewhat unique in that these
kinds of factual questions, when preliminarily contested, may be decided by one
of two9 administrative factfinders: a hearing officer designated by the Office of
Administrative Hearings (OAH) or,10 in “medically contested cases,” by a panel of
the “Medical Commission.”11
For a legal observer, the question almost immediately arises as to what level
of “deference” courts should afford administrative officials engaging in workers’
compensation fact finding when it is challenged in a proceeding for judicial
review.12 Wyoming, like nineteen other states, and tribunals under the federal
Longshore Harbor Workers’ Act, applies the “substantial evidence” standard of
review.13 That standard is expressed in various ways but a common formulation
is that the decision of an administrative agency will be upheld if it is based
on evidence that a “reasonable mind could accept as supporting the agency’s
determination.”14 In Wyoming, however, the state supreme court also upholds
4

Id. § 27-14-403.

5

Id. § 27-14-502.

6

Id. § 27-14-102(a)(vii).

See, e.g., Shelest v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 3, ¶ 14,
222 P.3d 167, 171 (Wyo. 2010) (denying claim on the basis that employee’s injuries did not occur
while he was acting within the course of his employment).
7

8
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-601–616. Internal administrative agency determinations may,
of course, at times involve mixed questions of fact and law. Bernard Schwartz, Mixed Questions of
Law and Fact and the Administrative Procedure Act, 19 Fordham L. Rev. 73, 73 (1950) (“A theory
of review based upon the “law-fact” distinction assumes that there is a more or less clear-cut division
between “law” and “fact,” with the former for the judge and the latter for the administrator.”).
9
Initial, pre-dispute claims processing is conducted directly by the Wyoming Safety and
Compensation Division (WSCD). See generally Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(vi).
10

See id. § 27-14-602(a); infra notes 181–211 and accompanying text.

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616(b)(iv); Judd v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety &
Comp. Div., 2010 WY 85, ¶ 30, 233 P.3d 956, 968 (Wyo. 2010) (holding that claimant may not
contest decisions by the WSCD to refer a case to the Medical Commission); infra notes 189–211
and accompanying text (discussing Medical Commission).
11

12
In this context, deference may be defined as “[a] polite and respectful attitude or approach,
esp. toward an important person or venerable institution whose action, proposal, opinion, or
judgment should be presumptively accepted.” Deference, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014). The “deference” in question is to evidentiary or fact-finding review, and not to statutory
interpretation, as in “Chevron” deference.

12 Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 130.01 (Matthew Bender,
Rev. Ed.); Wyo Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E).
13

See, e.g., Price v. State ex rel. Wyo. Dep’t of Workforce Services, Workers’ Comp. Div., 2017
WY 16, ¶ 7, 388 P.3d 786, 789–90 (2017) (“Substantial evidence means ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”). This formulation of the
14
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decisions by workers’ compensation administrative agency officials deemed “not
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”15 It is unclear whether this
“overwhelming weight” formulation is an odd version of the traditional substantial
evidence rule—sometimes the “overwhelming weight” and “substantial evidence”
rules are used in the same paragraph—or is another standard altogether.16 This
unclear situation is the focus of this article. Because of the nature of the focus,
the article must frequently transition between administrative procedural law and
substantive workers’ compensation law issues.
An overwhelming weight standard certainly does not on its face resemble
a “substantial evidence” standard. Although standards of review are seldom
flawlessly precise, attentive students of administrative law are aware that the
trend in administrative law, over the last several decades, has been against hyperinsulation of administrative agency fact-finding.17 The U.S. Supreme Court’s
landmark opinion in Universal Camera stood, in essence, for the proposition that
the decision of an administrative tribunal should be supported by more than
just any evidence.18 Most agree that courts lack the authority to substitute their
judgment for the decision of an administrative agency19—that is to say, it is not
enough that a court might have found differently from an administrative agency

rule is commonly ascribed to the Supreme Court’s opinion in Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
15
See, e.g., Dale v. S & S Builders, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d 554, 561 (Wyo. 2008)
(“If the hearing examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of proof,
we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision to reject the
evidence offered by the burdened party by considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a whole.”). For thorough analysis of Dale, see
infra notes 268–302 and accompanying text. The standard is alternatively articulated as “whether
the conclusion was clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.” Watkins v. State ex
rel. Wyoming Med. Comm’n, 2011 WY 49, ¶ 16, 250 P.3d 1082, 1086 (Wyo. 2011). In addition,
the standard considers “whether the conclusion was clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of
the evidence considered on the record as a whole.” In re Bilyeu v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’
Safety & Comp. Div., 2012 WY 141, ¶ 7, 287 P.3d 773, 775 (Wyo. 2012). The essence of the
principle for purposes of this article is that the weight of the evidence against the agency’s position
must be overwhelming to justify a court’s reversal on evidentiary grounds.
16

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 62–89 and accompanying text. As will be developed, substantial evidence is
essentially reasonableness review of factual determinations. See generally T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of
Roswell, Georgia, 135 S.Ct. 808 (2015). “Reasonableness review conveys to the court that it need
not delve so deeply into the agency’s judgment so as to assure that the conclusion is correct. Yet it
tells the court to assure that there is a relatively high probability that the agency is correct.” Charles
H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy, 3 Admin L. & Prac. § 9.24 (3d ed. 2017).
17

18
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951); see infra notes 129–49
and accompanying text for the federal discussion. See infra notes 303–15 and accompanying text
(further developing this point in the context of Wyoming Administrative Law).
19

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Roggenbuck, 938 P.2d 851, 853 (Wyo. 1997).
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if finding facts in the first instance in any given case.20 Neither, however, should
a court be required to acquiesce when it cannot in good conscience uphold the
decision of an agency.21 The “overwhelming weight” standard seems contrarily
to say that a Wyoming court may not set aside the decision of an administrative
agency unless the weight of the evidence is overwhelmingly against the agency.22
The overwhelming weight standard simply “feels” wrong. The evidence in a
given case may not be overwhelmingly against an agency’s position, yet still not
reasonably support it. Surely, a court ought to be free to reverse an administrative
agency, if it cannot in good conscience underwrite an outcome.
This article demonstrates that, whatever the relationship between the
overwhelming weight and substantial evidence standards, Wyoming courts
mistakenly adopted the overwhelming weight standard in the 1970s based on
an outdated administrative law encyclopedia entry from 1962.23 The standard
should either be abandoned or much more clearly explained, especially in
light of, and to address, the standard’s questionable origins. In the first place,
the overwhelming weight standard is inconsistent with a contemporary legal
understanding of substantial evidence.24 Secondly, the potentially-aggressive,
benefit-reducing standard25 that the overwhelming weight threatens to
routinely become is especially inappropriate in a state like Wyoming. Wyoming

20
Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488 (assessing entirety of record does not entitle courts
to “negative” conclusions of expert agencies or displace the agencies’ choices between two “fairly
conflicting views” even though courts would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter
been before them de novo).
21

Id.

22

See infra notes 109 –13 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 114–49 and accompanying text. In fact, at least one Wyoming court has
precisely captured this evolution, but for subtle reasons, other courts seem not to have followed. See
infra notes 303–15 and accompanying text; Bd. of Trs. v. Colwell, 611 P.2d 427, 429 (Wyo. 1980).
24

Although beyond the scope of this article, Wyoming’s status as a “monopolistic”
state—a state in which the state government rather than private insurance companies insures
workers’ compensation benefits—is an important background consideration when evaluating its
workers’ compensation legal issues. Maureen Gallagher, States of Confusion: Workers’ Compensation
Extraterritorial Issues, Ins. Partners Acad. 6 –7 (2016), http://www.insurancepartnersacademy.
com/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/2016-WC-Extraterritorial-Issues-1-16-Edition-1.pdf. Since
the state is the payer of claims, it is not merely an arbiter of essentially private disputes. Robert
P. Hartwig, Competitive Workers’ Compensation Task Force Meeting, Ohio Bureau of Workers’
Compensation, Ins. Info. Inst. 5–6 (2010), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/Ohio
WCTestimony-0819101.pdf. The state obviously has a budgetary interest in the outcome of
disputes that cannot rationally be ignored, since unlike private insurance companies, it both defines
its liability and decides whether it will pay claims. Id. At the time of the establishment of such state
funds, in the early 20th century, there was great concern about the political interplay between the
state monopolistic funds and other departments of state government. Price V. Fishback & Shawn
E. Kantor, Prelude to the Welfare State, The Origins of Workers’ Compensation 153–54
(University of Chicago Press 2007).
25
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constitutionally ensures that labor has “just protection” under law,26 provides
citizens a fundamental right to access courts for the purpose of asserting claims for
personal injury,27 and forbids laws limiting damages for injury and death.28 The
Wyoming constitution also voids any employer-employee contract or agreement
by an employer that waives a right to recover damages for causing the death or
injury of an employee.29 The risk of rights’ deprivation by effectively insulated
agency action in such a rich constitutional environment is simply too high. To
be clear, the degree of decisional deference afforded by courts to administrative
agencies is a complicated and ongoing topic of debate in many substantive
legal domains in which administrative bodies make decisions.30 But one should
remember that highly deferential judicial standards of review of administrative
agency action shift power in tangible ways to the executive branch.31 Whether
that is a desirable policy choice for Wyoming is a question that should be taken
on cautiously and explicitly, not accidentally.
The plan of this article is as follows. Part II of the article traces the origins
of the “overwhelming weight” standard in Wyoming.32 Shifting to administrative
law, Part III explains the emergence of the traditional substantial evidence
rule under federal law as a reaction to Wagner (National Labor Relations) Act
decisions of the federal circuit courts in the early and mid-1930s.33 The reaction,
as discussed in the Supreme Court opinion, Universal Camera,34 produced a
deliberate “movement” in administrative law away from a de facto “any evidence”
standard.35 Though there was not universal agreement on the claim, many argued
26
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 22 (“The rights of labor shall have just protection through laws
calculated to secure to the laborer proper rewards for his service and to promote the industrial
welfare of the state.”).
27

See infra notes 241–46 and accompanying text.

28

See infra notes 241–50 and accompanying text.

29

See infra notes 241–51 and accompanying text.

See generally Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Richard Murphy, 3 Admin L. & Prac. § 11:22 (3d
ed. 2017).
30

31
See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 Colum. L.
Rev. 1749, 1751 (2007) (discussing one role of courts reviewing administrative action as mediation
between legislative and executive branches).
32

See infra notes 44–113 and accompanying text.

33

See infra notes 114–49 and accompanying text.

34

See Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 478–80 (1951).

35

Id. at 487– 88.
Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality
of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of evidence
which, in and of itself, justified it, without taking into account contradictory
evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new
legislation definitively precludes such a theory of review and bars its practice. The
substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly
detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both
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that courts were applying an “any evidence” standard of review to early New Deal
administrative agency decisions, resulting, the argument went, in the rubberstamping of virtually all agency action.36 Part IV discusses administrative agency
evidentiary review in the context of agency expertise.37 Many states, including
Wyoming, advance agency expertise as a justification for affording agencies
deference.38 Other states appear to have deliberately adhered to standards of
review in which courts will uphold administrative agency decisions supported
by any evidence.39 Much of Wyoming workers’ compensation system is relatively
“non-expert,” which appears to weaken the case for hyper-deferential judicial
review of administrative workers’ compensation decisions.40 Part V focuses closely
on Wyoming administrative law decisions and reveals that, in fact, important
Wyoming precedent and statutory law have acknowledged the Universal Camera
substantial evidence “movement,”41 but subsequent Wyoming cases have applied,
without adequate explanation, a substantial evidence rule in derogation of modern
administrative law.42 Finally, Part VI concludes by arguing that the Wyoming
Supreme Court should either abandon the overwhelming weight standard or
explain more clearly what relationship it has to the contemporary understanding
of substantial evidence.43 This article argues that Wyoming courts should apply
the actual substantial evidence standard, but takes the position that, in any event,
the substantial evidence and overwhelming weight standards fundamentally
differ and cannot rationally coexist without the courts providing additional
doctrinal guidance.

II. Origins of the “Overwhelming Weight” Formulation
This Part analyzes the development of Wyoming’s overwhelming weight
standard of judicial review of agency action. It explores the standard as one
appearing to hold that the courts may not set aside agency action unless the agency
is overwhelmingly wrong. First, the Part explores a judicial opinion appearing to
exemplify what can go wrong when courts feel constrained to apply minimal

statutes [the Administrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts] that courts consider
the whole record. Committee reports and the adoption in the Administrative
Procedure Act of the minority views of the Attorney General’s Committee
demonstrate that to enjoin such a duty on the reviewing court was one of the
important purposes of the movement which eventuated in that enactment.
36

Id.

37

See infra notes 150–236 and accompanying text.

38

See infra notes 158–80 and accompanying text.

39

See infra notes 212–25 and accompanying text.

40

See infra notes 181–211 and accompanying text.

41

See infra notes 303–15 and accompanying text.

42

See infra notes 237–331 and accompanying text.

43

See infra notes 332–38 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny to agency fact finding.44 The Part then locates the case-law origin of
the overwhelming weight standard, revealing that the Wyoming Supreme Court
borrowed the standard from an American Jurisprudence administrative law
encyclopedia that inaccurately equated the substantial evidence and overwhelming
weight standards.45 Finally, the Part commences exploration of the impact the
erroneous borrowing has had on Wyoming law by transitioning to the history of
the traditional substantial evidence rule.46

A. Setting the Stage: The Moss Opinion
The general oddity in the phraseology of the overwhelming weight standard
would, standing alone, invite investigation of its origins.47 The language of the
standard has been used in only two states, Wyoming and Missouri.48 As applied
in Wyoming, the standard demands explication. The Wyoming Supreme Court’s
opinion, in Moss v. Wyoming Workers’ Safety and Compensation Division, is a useful
vehicle for demonstrating the practical impact that renders the standard more
than just a curiosity.49 In Moss, the Division denied Moss’s claim50 based on the
Medical Commission’s rejection of Moss’s testimony of pain and disability as not
credible.51 Moss was partially, but seriously, disabled; and after he exhausted his
temporary total disability benefits, he applied for permanent and total disability
benefits under Wyoming’s “odd lot doctrine”:
To be entitled to an award of benefits under the odd lot
doctrine, an employee must prove: 1) he is no longer capable of
performing the job he had at the time of his injury and 2) the
degree of his physical impairment coupled with other factors
such as his mental capacity, education, training and age make
him eligible for PTD benefits even though he is not totally
incapacitated . . . To satisfy this burden, an employee must also
demonstrate he made reasonable efforts to find work in his
community after reaching maximum medical improvement or,
alternatively, that he was so completely disabled by his workrelated injury that any effort to find employment would have
been futile . . . If the employee meets his burden, the employer

44

See infra notes 47– 61; 62– 89 and accompanying text.

45

See infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text.

46

See infra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.

47

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

48

See infra notes 49–99, 226–36 and accompanying text.

Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, 232 P.3d 1
(Wyo. 2010).
49

50

Id. at ¶ 1, 232 P.3d at 3.

51

Id. at ¶¶ 17–37, 232 P.3d at 6–11.
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must then prove that “light work of a special nature which the
employee could perform but which is not generally available in
fact is available to the employee.”52
Writing for the majority, Justice Kite found that “[g]iven the evidence Mr.
Moss presented, there is no question but that he met his burden of showing that
the degree of his physical impairment coupled with other factors such as his mental
capacity, education, training and age make him eligible for PTD benefits.”53 The
Medical Commission threw everything but the kitchen sink at Moss, and it drew
an unusually sharp response from the Justice:
The record indicates that the Medical Commission disregarded
relevant evidence, made incorrect assumptions about other
evidence and, rather than considering the evidence fairly and
objectively, generally viewed it in the light most likely to result in
a denial of benefits. An employee has a right to be heard before
an unbiased, fair and impartial tribunal . . . Some of the Medical
Commission’s findings and conclusions cast doubt on whether
the proceedings in this case satisfied that right.54
Despite the significant underlying irregularities in the Medical Commission
fact–finding proceeding, Justice Kite upheld the Division’s decision finding that
“it came forward with sufficient evidence to refute Mr. Moss’s evidence and to
prove work within his limitations was available.”55 Nevertheless, Justice Kite
held, “We cannot conclude that the Medical Commission’s ruling was against the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.”56

52

Id. at ¶ 14, 232 P.3d at 5 (internal citations omitted).

53

Id. at ¶ 22, 232 P.3d at 7.

Id. at ¶ 40, 232 P.3d at 11 (internal citations omitted). The Medical Commission
discredited Moss and his doctors, found Moss’s favorable social security disability decision irrelevant
when it was almost certainly relevant, and mischaracterized or overemphasized video evidence. Id.
54

55
Id. at ¶ 43, 232 P.3d at 11–12. The outcome is questionable because its basis is not parallel
to the burden-shifting requirement for odd-lot analysis under Wyoming law. See id. Once Justice
Kite had found that Moss met his preliminary burden, the burden of production shifted to the
Division to show that “light work of a special nature which the employee could perform but which
is not generally available in fact is available to the employee.” Id. at ¶ 14, 232 P.3d at 5. According
to Justice Kite, “the Division . . . presented evidence that light work was available in the geographic
area in which Mr. Moss resides.” Id. at ¶ 43, 232 P.3d at 11–12. But the standard required the
Division to have shown that light work of a special nature was in fact available to Moss. Id. This the
Division, through Moss’s vocational expert, did not do. Id.
56
Id. at ¶ 43, 232 P.3d at 12 (emphasis added). It is not clear whether the majority meant
to say that the Division’s decision was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. See
id. The Court reviews the decision of the “administrative agency” directly and, in this context,
it is somewhat unclear as to whether the Division, the Medical Commission, or both is “the
administrative agency.” See id.
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In dissent, Justice Hill departed sharply from the majority’s opinion. In an
especially poignant passage, Justice Hill wrote:
The evidence offered by the Division was not the sort of evidence
that “a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” The majority has already rejected most of the
Medical Commission’s findings that negatively impacted Moss’s
case. That circumstance leads me to view with distrust this final
finding made by the Commission, which now must bear the
entire weight of the final decision to deny Moss the benefits at
issue here.57
Justice Hill did not refer to the “overwhelming weight” standard. Rather, he
stated that “[t]he evidence offered by the Division was not the sort of evidence
that ‘a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’”58
The foregoing reveals that the difference between the “overwhelming weight”
and “substantial evidence” formulations were at center stage. As already discussed,
under Wyoming law, both phrases purport to be formulations of something called
57

Id. at ¶ 48, 232 P.3d at 14 (Hill, J., dissenting).

Id. at ¶ 52, 232 P.3d at 14. Aside from the unwillingness of Justice Hill to credit the
Commission at all on the ultimate conclusion of permanent and total disability in light of its
“play[ing] loose and fast with the facts,” it was also clear that the majority and the dissent had
differences of opinion on the correct “odd lot doctrine” standard to apply. See id. Justice Hill quoted
at length Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp.:
58

. . . If the evidence of degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled with
other facts such as the claimant’s mental capacity, education, training, or age,
places claimant prima facie in the odd-lot category, the burden should be on the
employer to show that some kind of suitable work is regularly and continuously
available to the claimant. Certainly in such a case it should not be enough to
show that claimant is physically capable of performing light work, and then round
out the case for noncompensability by adding a presumption that light work
is available . . .
The corollary of the general-purpose principle just stated would be this: If the
claimant’s medical impairment is so limited or specialized in nature that he is not
obviously unemployable or relegated to the odd-lot category, it is not unreasonable
to place the burden of proof on him to establish unavailability of work to a person
in his circumstances, which normally would require a showing that he has made
reasonable efforts to secure suitable employment . . .
Other jurisdictions in this context have held that an employee in circumstances
similar to those of the appellant must show that reasonable efforts have been made
to obtain suitable employment in order to meet their burden of proof and shift the
burden of proof to the employer . . .”
Id. (quoting Schepanovich v. U.S. Steel Corp., 669 P.2d 522, 525 (Wyo.1983)).
Justice Hill seemed correct in pointing out that the odd-lot standard he recited would have
made it easier for an employee to make out a prima facie odd-lot claim. See id. The larger point,
however, was that the outcome was not acceptable to a reasonable mind under the circumstances.
See id.
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“substantial evidence.”59 It is difficult (although not impossible) to accept that
the factual findings of a generally untrustworthy administrative agency decision
could be reasonable. At a certain point, however, a reasonable mind, recognizing
the corruption of a fact-finding proceeding, might find its conscience being
challenged in upholding such a corrupted decision. A court in such a frame of
mind might wish to simply remand an adjudication to an agency for renewed
fact-finding. On the other hand, if an agency produces any credible evidence,
and an adverse party produces merely some evidence in opposition to the agency’s
position, it may be difficult for a court to set aside the agency’s decision under
the overwhelming weight standard. This dilemma seemed to be at the heart
of the disagreement between Justices Kite and Hill, and there is no persuasive
evidence that the Wyoming legislature meant to disempower Wyoming courts in
this manner.
In light of the difficulties inherent in applying the “overwhelming weight”
standard, it is important to explore its origins.60 The departure from traditional
substantial evidence principles represented by the overwhelming weight standard
warrants exploration of whether the Wyoming courts have a cogent rationale for
modifying traditional substantial evidence analysis.61

B. The Impact of Spiegel
The first instance of use of the “overwhelming weight” standard in a Wyoming
case is Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel.62 In Spiegel, Sydney Spiegel
appealed to a Wyoming district court the decision of the Laramie School District
No. 1 not to renew his teaching contract.63 The dispute was first appealed to a
state district court, and then to the Wyoming Supreme Court.64 Much of the
supreme court’s discussion of the case concerned the sufficiency of the procedural
due process afforded Spiegel during the school district’s deliberations.65 Among
other issues considered by the court, however, was whether the school district’s
factual findings, in connection with the non-renewal decision, were supported
by substantial evidence, an issue relevant under the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act, which governed judicial review of the school district’s decision.66
In analyzing this question, the court surveyed a number of substantial evidence

59

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

60

See infra notes 62–108 and accompanying text.

61

See infra notes 62–89 and accompanying text.

62

Bd. of Trs. v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (Wyo. 1976).

63

Id. at 1163.

64

Id.

65

Id. at 1164 –73.

Id. at 1177 (citing the then-existing statutory provision Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-276.32 (1975
Cum. Supp.)).
66
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formulations, including definitions from the Pennsylvania courts,67 the United
States Supreme Court,68 and, importantly, §. 688 of the American Jurisprudence
Administrative Law encyclopedia.69 In the then-current version of the
encyclopedia, among the tests of substantial evidence articulated was whether the
decision is not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”70
The Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the district court’s reversal of the school
district’s non-renewal determination.71 The court stated:
Applying the foregoing definitions, standards and tests for use and
application of the substantial evidence rule, we are compelled to
hold, as we do, that the Board, given the facts in this record, could
not reasonably, and, absent action characterized by arbitrariness,
capriciousness and bias, have reached the conclusion it did. We,
therefore, find that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conclusion that there was cause to terminate.72
The difficulty with this determination is that it cannot be ascertained,
specifically, which definitions the court meant to apply. With respect to “whether
the decision is not clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence,”
the court’s definitional language was obscure:
The test as to whether or not there is substantial evidence has
been said to be ‘. . . whether the administrative decision finds
reasonable support in substantial evidence, whether the evidence
reasonably tends to support the findings, or, it has been indicated,
whether the decision is not clearly contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.’73
The court was evidently summarizing the then-current version of the
American Jurisprudence Administrative Law encyclopedia.74 But the
summarization was a hodgepodge of differing substantial evidence rules on the
relevant encyclopedia page.75 When, therefore, the court stated it was “applying

67

Id. at 1178.

Id. (citing Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607 (1966) (citing cases of the National
Labor Relations Board and the Federal Trade Commission)).
68

69

Id. at 1178.

70

Id.

71

Id. at 1180.

72

Id. at 1177–78.

73

Id. at 1178.

74

Id. (citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 688 (1962)).

75

Id.
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the foregoing definitions,” a present reader is hard-pressed to know which
definitions the court intended to reference.76
Whatever Spiegel meant to say, it became clear, in due course, that Wyoming
courts would press the “overwhelming weight” standard into frequent service.
The first Wyoming workers’ compensation case utilizing the “overwhelming
weight” standard was Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division v. Brown, decided
in 1991.77 In Brown, a state district court reversed a reduction in attorneys’ fees
and costs by the Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings because “there
was no factual basis to determine that the fees billed by [the attorney] were not
reasonable and necessary.”78 In considering the Division’s appeal of the district
court’s decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court, for the first time in a Wyoming
Workers’ Compensation decision, said, “[w]e have indicated we defer to the
experience and expertise of the agency in its weighing of the evidence and will
disturb its decisions only where it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight
of the evidence on record.”79 In applying the substantial evidence standard the
Brown Court cited to Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation Center v. Employment
Security Commission of Wyoming 80 and Cody Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission
of Wyoming.81 Southwest Wyoming Rehabilitation, an unemployment compensation case, in turn cited to Spiegel in defining substantial evidence generally,82
and to Cody Gas in connection with the “clearly contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence” standard.83 Cody Gas, in turn, cited to Wyoming
Insurance Co. v. Avemco Ins. Co.,84 which in its turn cited Big Piney Oil & Gas
Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission,85 which, again, cited back
to Spiegel.86
Thus, Spiegel was the progenitor of the “overwhelming weight” standard. No
Wyoming court employed the standard prior to the Spiegel decision in 1976.87
By the late 1970s, courts routinely adopted the standard without explaining
76

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

77

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991).

78

Id. at 833.

79

Id.

80

Sw. Wyo. Rehab. Ctr. v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of Wyo., 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989).

81

Cody Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wyo., 748 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 1988).

Sw. Wyo. Rehab. Ctr.,781 P.2d at 921. It is worth noting that Justice Urbigkit authored both
Brown and Sw. Wyo. Rehab. Ctr.
82

83

Id.

Cody Gas Co., 748 P.2d at 1146 (citing Wyo. Ins. Dept. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 726 P.2d 507,
509 (Wyo. 1986)).
84

Avemco Ins. Co., 726 P.2d at 509 (citing Big Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyo. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm’n, 715 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 1986)).
85

86

Big Piney Oil & Gas Co., 715 P.2d at 562.

87

See Bd. of Trs. v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (Wyo. 1976).
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it.88 Spiegel led directly to Brown and to the “overwhelming weight” standard as
applied in contemporary worker’s compensation cases like Moss.89

C. The Legal Encyclopedia Citation
To this point, this Part primarily has concerned itself with identifying the
precise origin of the “overwhelming weight” standard in Wyoming, locating it in
Spiegel ’s citation to an American Jurisprudence encyclopedia.90 It is noteworthy
that, by the time of the 1994 version of that encyclopedia, the “overwhelming
weight” formulation of substantial evidence had completely dropped out of the
encyclopedia,91 a result suggesting extremely infrequent usage of the formulation
outside of Wyoming.92
Spiegel ’s selection of the “overwhelming weight” formulation in 1976, even
if inadequately explained, would be understandable had it at that time been a
common articulation of “substantial evidence,” but it was not. The 1962 American
Jurisprudence encyclopedia cited to only two cases in two states where “it ha[d]
been indicated” the standard was used: Burke v. Coleman,93 a Missouri case, and
Central R. Co. of New Jersey v. Department of Public Utilities, a New Jersey case.94
Those two cases—a slender reed at all events—fail to reveal the existence of an
actual “overwhelming weight” articulation of substantial evidence.
Burke, for example, involved revocation of an innkeeper’s license to sell
“nonintoxicating beer.”95 In upholding the supervisor of liquor control, the court
stated, “[c]ertainly it cannot be said that the supervisor’s finding was clearly

88
In addition to the cases already discussed, see Beddow v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of Wyo.,
718 P.2d 12 (Wyo. 1986); City of Cheyenne Policemen Pension Bd. v. Perreault, 727 P.2d 702
(Wyo. 1986); Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 746 P.2d 1272 (Wyo. 1987);
Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of Equalization, 735 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1987); Mountain Fuel Supply
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (Wyo. 1983); Majority of Working Interest
Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 721 P.2d 1070 (Wyo.
1986); Clements v. Bd. of Trs., 585 P.2d 197 (Wyo. 1978); Laramie River Conservation Council
v. Indus. Siting Council, 588 P.2d 1241 (Wyo. 1978). Notably absent from this list are workers’
compensation cases, and notably present are energy related adjudications in which especially
technical considerations were under consideration.
89
See Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 43, 232 P.3d
1, 12 (Wyo. 2010).
90

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

91

See 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 539 (1994).

See infra notes 226–36 and accompanying text (noting the standard is also used in Missouri,
but has been significantly judicially limited).
92

93

Burke v. Coleman, 202 S.W.2d 809, 811 (Mo. 1947).

94

Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 81 A.2d 162, 168 (N.J. 1951).

95

Burke, 202 S.W.2d at 810.
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contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”96 Burke cited to a case
interpreting a 1946 Missouri revision of the state administrative code meant to
be consistent with the federal Administrative Procedure Act and to broaden the
scope of judicial review of administrative factual findings.97 The case to which
Burke cited, Wood v. Wagner Electric Corp., provided no legal source for the
invocation of the “clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence”
phraseology during its discussion of the appropriate review of administrative
findings.98 Thus, the Missouri standard was originally on very infirm ground.99
Central R. Co. of New Jersey, the New Jersey case cited by the 1962
encyclopedia,100 was a rate-setting case in which two railroads appealed a decision
of the New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners not to deny a requested
rate increase in favor of a rate that was thought fair to the public but adequate
to the railroads.101 The 1962 encyclopedia’s citation of this case to support the
“clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence” formulation is truly
bewildering because the case concerned the involved court’s jurisdiction and not
a standard of review.102 The dusty decision stated the court had inherent power to
96

Id. at 811.

Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. 1946) (emphasis added). The case
also has a state constitutional dimension that will be more fully discussed. See infra notes 226–36
and accompanying text.
97

98

Wood, 197 S.W.2d at 649.

For expanded discussion of developments in Missouri, see infra notes 226–36 and
accompanying text.
99

100

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.

101

Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J. v. Dep’t of Pub. Utils., 81 A.2d 162, 163–64 (N.J. 1951).

102

Id. at 168. The passage upon which the encyclopedia apparently relied states:
Although the legislature has expressed that orders of the Board are not to be
set aside unless there was no evidence before the Board to support the same
reasonably . . . , it is established that if such legislative suggestion were a limitation
upon a court constitutionally exercising the powers formerly exerted through the
medium of prerogative writs, the statute would be repugnant to the Constitution.
The statute now incorporated . . . , was enacted at a time when the former Supreme
Court was in existence and exercised ancient inherent jurisdiction over prerogative
writs. That court . . . said [in 1913]: ‘ . . . We are given jurisdiction to set aside
the order of the commissioners when it clearly appears that there was no evidence
before the board to support reasonably such order or that the same was without
the jurisdiction of the board. On its face this section confers jurisdiction upon this
court, but a jurisdiction of a limited character, only to be exercised when it clearly
appears that there is no evidence before the board to support their order, or where
the order is without their jurisdiction. If this language is taken literally, we should
be powerless in any case within the jurisdiction of the board to set aside its order
if there was any evidence to support it, no matter how overwhelming the evidence
to the contrary might be. It is needless to say that such a literal construction of
section 38 would bring it into conflict with our constitution. It needs no act of the
legislature to confer on us the power to review the action of an inferior tribunal,
and the legislature cannot limit us in the exercise of our ancient prerogative.’

Id.
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review agency decisions supported by no evidence or concerning which there was
overwhelming evidence contrary to the Board’s position whatever the legislature
had to say about the matter.103 The original statement was necessary because the
statute explicitly recited that courts were without authority to review a decision
of the Board supported by any evidence.104 The Central R. Co. of New Jersey
court restated this proposition because the “no evidence” language remained in
the statute despite the intervening decades.105 This was, however, a jurisdictional
question respecting the reviewability of the Board’s activity, and the encyclopedia
erroneously cited the case as an exemplar of the quantum of evidence necessary to
sustain an agency’s factual determinations.106 Once the Central R. Co. of New Jersey
court concluded that it possessed jurisdiction to review, it cited cases emphasizing
the necessity that rate setting be reasonable, and invoked Universal Camera Corp.
v. N.L.R.B. in the course of its discussion.107 The tenor of the opinion is steeped
in whole-record review and well-removed from the idea that an agency’s decision
must necessarily be upheld unless “clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of
the evidence.”108

D. Consequence
Accordingly, the “overwhelming weight” formulation of substantial evidence
was an unsupportable creation of the 1962 Administrative Law American
Jurisprudence encyclopedia, which cited one case which seemed to pull the
standard from thin air (Burke),109 and another that borrowed the standard
inattentively from an ancient New Jersey case (Central R. Co. of New Jersey).110
The standard was never an expression of “substantial evidence.” One may wish
to contend either that the policy of the formulation is sound or that it should
be maintained for reasons of stare decisis. Before addressing those arguments, the
article will proceed to a more general discussion of substantial evidence and its

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

Id. at 168– 69. As will soon be developed, Universal Camera stands in “spiritual” opposition
to excessively deferential review by courts of agency fact finding. See infra notes 129 –49 and
accompanying text.
107

Cent. R.R. Co. of N.J., 81 A.2d at 168– 69 (“It is now firmly settled in our system of
jurisprudence that there must be sufficient or substantial competent and relevant evidence to support
the findings of fact and reasonableness of the rates established by the Board.”) (citations omitted).
108

109

See supra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.

110

See supra notes 100–08 and accompanying text.
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relationship to the United States Supreme Court’s Universal Camera opinion,
which discussed substantial evidence within the confines of the judicial review
provisions of the Administrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts.111 It is through
that prism that one can better consider the extent to which the “overwhelming
weight” formulation departs from now traditional notions of substantial evidence.
As the article will show in the course of the ensuing discussion, the “overwhelming
weight” formulation bears strong resemblance to a version of judicial review
specifically rejected during legislative deliberations over the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946.112 In other words, not only is the “overwhelming weight”
formulation not a substantial evidence standard, at the time of the enactment of
the federal Administrative Procedure Act policy makers and courts saw it as a
narrower alternative to substantial evidence.113

III. The Relationship of the Substantial Evidence Standard to the
Administrative Procedure and Taft-Hartley Acts
Having established the origins of the “overwhelming weight” standard in Part
II, the next Part explains that the historical origins of substantial evidence are
steeped in a political reaction to what was widely perceived in the late 1930s as an
unacceptably relaxed standard of review.114 As the first section of the Part reveals,
Spiegel appeared to either misunderstand or underappreciate this history.115
The Part moves from exposition of that historical underappreciation to a fuller
explanation of the historical origins of the substantial evidence rule, which leads,
by way of Universal Camera, directly to an understanding of substantial evidence
paralleling “whole record review.”116

A. Spiegel’s Canvassing of Substantial Evidence Law
It is instructive to recall the authorities upon which Spiegel relied when
attempting to clarify the Wyoming substantial evidence standard.117 The earliest
Wyoming case cited was from 1950, Howard v. Lindmier, which said of substantial
evidence that “it does not include the idea of weight of evidence, although it
is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”118 For that proposition,

111

See infra notes 114–49 and accompanying text.

112

See infra notes 114–49 and accompanying text.

113

See infra notes 114–49 and accompanying text.

114

See infra notes 115– 49 and accompanying text.

115

See infra notes 117–28 and accompanying text.

116

See infra notes 129– 49 and accompanying text.

117

See supra notes 62–89 and accompanying text.

118

Howard v. Lindmier, 214 P.2d 737, 740 (Wyo. 1950).
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Lindmier cited a Wisconsin case,119 which in turn cited a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board.120 The other two Wyoming cases Spiegel cited for authority
on substantial evidence relied squarely upon Lindmier.121 Thus, there is a direct
line from Wyoming substantial evidence law, as of 1950, to the substantial
evidence cases decided under the National Labor Relations Act.
Spiegel also went beyond Wyoming law on the substantial evidence question.
Aside from the encyclopedia122, Spiegel cited Pennsylvania authority resting on
a 1940s-era case, Pennsylvania State Board of Medical Education and Licensure v.
Schireson.123 Schireson involved the revocation of a medical license.124 In reversing
the State Board of Medical Education and Licensure’s decision to revoke
Schireson’s license, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court defined substantial evidence
as “more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”125 The Schireson court
relied on National Labor Relations Act case law for this formulation of substantial
evidence, citing a case upon which Spiegel itself relied,126 Consolidated Edison Co.
of New York v. National Labor Relations Board.127
In sum, Spiegel ’s discussion of substantial evidence was either based on a
non-existent substantial evidence standard, or on substantial evidence as defined
in Supreme Court cases analyzing the substantial evidence standard as applied
to the National Labor Relations Board’s decisions.128 The history of the judicial
review of factual findings under the National Labor Relations Act is complicated.
To properly contextualize this NLRA authority, upon which Spiegel relied, the
next section discusses that history.

B. Reaction to Wagner Act Judicial Review
In Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B.,129 “the [U.S. Supreme] Court
decided that the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure

119

Gateway City Transfer Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 34 N.W.2d 238, 242 (Wis. 1948).

120

Id. at 242 (citing Washington Va. & Md. Coach Co. v. N.L.R.B, 301 U.S. 142 (1937)).

Rayburne v. Queen, 326 P.2d 1108, 1109 (Wyo. 1958); J. Ray McDermott & Co. v.
Hudson, 348 P.2d 73, 76 (Wyo. 1960).
121

122

See supra notes 62–113 and accompanying text.

Bd. of Trs. v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d 1161, 1178 (Wyo. 1976) (citing Pa. State Bd. of Med. Educ.
& Licensure v. Schireson, 61 A.2d 343 (Pa. 1948)).
123

124

Schireson, 61 A.2d at 344– 45.

125

Id. at 346.

126

Spiegel, 549 P.2d at 1178.

127

Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197 (1938).

128

See supra notes 90–113 and accompanying text.

129

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 487–91, 494 (1951).
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and Taft-Hartley Acts were identical in meaning, the legislative history of both
Acts indicated the same purpose behind these provisions, and these statutes had
broadened the scope of judicial review.”130 In this context, “broadening” meant
affording courts greater latitude to review and, if necessary, reverse decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board. Justice Frankfurter, the author of Universal
Camera, wrote:
. . . [T]he requirement for canvassing ‘the whole record’ in order
to ascertain substantiality does not furnish a calculus of value
by which a reviewing court can assess the evidence. Nor was it
intended to negative the function of the Labor Board as one of
those agencies presumably equipped or informed by experience
to deal with a specialized field of knowledge, whose findings
within that field carry the authority of an expertness which
courts do not possess and therefore must respect. Nor does it
mean that even as to matters not requiring expertise a court may
displace the Board’s choice between two fairly conflicting views,
even though the court would justifiably have made a different
choice had the matter been before it de novo. Congress has
merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from
setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously
find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes,
including the body of evidence opposed to the Board’s view.131
Prior to the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1946, which was a second,
updated version of the National Labor Relations Act132, the 1935 Wagner Act
stated in Section 10(e): “the findings of the Board as to the facts ‘if supported
by evidence, shall be conclusive.’”133 While some federal circuit courts may have
been providing something like what became “whole record review,”134 others were
apparently not doing so, and there was a “mood” to reform judicial review of

Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: “Substantial Evidence on the Whole Record,” 64 Harv. L.
Rev. 1233, 1233–34 (1951) [hereinafter Substantial Evidence]. Professor Louis Jaffe, a Harvard
Law School professor specializing in administrative law, was a keen and sophisticated contemporary
observer of what became a reaction against the obviously extremely deferential “if supported by
evidence” standard. See id.
130

131

Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 488.

The first version of the National Labor Relations Act is commonly known as the “Wagner
Act,” after its strong proponent in the U.S. Senate, Robert F. Wagner of New York. See generally
Paul M. Secunda, Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Michael C. Duff, Labor Law 19–21 (Carolina Academic
Press 2017).
132

133
N.L.R.B. v. Link-Belt, 311 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); see also N.L.R.B v. Waterman S.S. Corp.,
309 U.S. 206 (1940).
134

Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 490.
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administrative agencies.135 Well, perhaps somewhat more than a mood, for in
1939 the Walter-Logan Bill was passed,136 though vetoed by Franklin Roosevelt.137
Walter-Logan was essentially a protest against the operations of newlyminted New Deal administrative agencies, and, despite the Walter-Logan veto,
Roosevelt, at the suggestion of the Attorney General and others, appointed an
expert committee to study administrative practices and procedures.138 The Report
of the Committee generated a “minority report,”139 which reflected the views
of committee participants wishing to make alternative proposals to Congress
regarding proposed changes to administrative law.140 The minority position on
the standard of review held that “courts should set aside decisions clearly contrary
to the manifest weight of evidence. Otherwise, important litigated issues of fact are
in effect conclusively determined in administrative decisions based upon palpable
error.”141 This formulation of judicial review is obviously very similar to the
Wyoming “overwhelming weight of the evidence” articulation. But the minority
report originally proposed the “manifest weight” standard as an alternative to
substantial evidence, not an explication of it.142

135

Id. at 487.
It is fair to say that in all this Congress expressed a mood. And it expressed its
mood not merely by oratory but by legislation. As legislation that mood must be
respected, even though it can only serve as a standard for judgment and not as a
body of rigid rules assuring sameness of applications. Enforcement of such broad
standards implies subtlety of mind and solidity of judgment. But it is not for us to
question that Congress may assume such qualities in the federal judiciary.

Id.
Note, Final Report: Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedures, 16 Ind. L.J.
541 (1941).
136

137

Jaffe, Substantial Evidence, supra note 130 at 1236; Universal Camera Corp. at 479– 80.

Louis J. Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, 8
U. Chi. L. Rev. 401, 402 (1941).
138

139

Id. n.4.

140

Id.

141

Id. at 435 (citing Minority Report at 211).

142

In similar vein, the House version of Taft-Hartley:
provided that the ‘findings of the Board as to the facts shall be conclusive unless
it is made to appear to the satisfaction of the court either (1) that the findings
of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence, or (2) that the findings
of fact are not supported by substantial evidence.’ The bill left the House
with this provision. Early committee prints in the Senate provided for review
by ‘weight of the evidence’ or ‘clearly erroneous’ standards. But, as the Senate
Committee Report relates, ‘it was finally decided to conform the statute to the corresponding section of the Administrative Procedure Act where the substantial
evidence test prevails.

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 484 (1951) (internal citations omitted).
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These observations demonstrate substantial evidence, as a standard of judicial
review, was developed as a compromise by those who wished to defend agency
action against allegations that courts were simply rubber-stamping agency action,
especially adjudications under the Wagner Act. Universal Camera explained:
The adoption in [the Taft-Hartley and Administrative Procedure
Acts] of the judicially-constructed ‘substantial evidence’ test
was a response to pressures for stricter and more uniform
practice, not a reflection of approval of all existing practices. To
find the change so elusive that it cannot be precisely defined
does not mean it may be ignored. We should fail in our duty
to effectuate the will of Congress if we denied recognition to
expressed Congressional disapproval of the finality accorded
to Labor Board findings by some decisions of this and lower
courts, or even of the atmosphere which may have favored
those decisions.143
Fearing that the substantial evidence standard still prevented effective judicial
review, dissenters from the compromise initially offered standards like “clearly
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence” to broaden judicial review of
agency fact-finding.144 Admittedly, there is some confusion in the verbal formulae:
the Walter-Logan Protesters used phrases like “clearly contrary to the manifest
weight” because they believed the substantial evidence standard was de facto an
“any evidence” standard.145 This article, of course, argues that the “overwhelming
weight” standard has been utilized by Wyoming courts to prevent, not facilitate,
more intrusive judicial review of agency fact-finding.
Ultimately, the Wyoming courts have unwittingly borrowed an antithesis to
traditional “substantial evidence” review because a 1962 American Jurisprudence
encyclopedia inattentively failed to analyze the standards of review it cited.146 A
decade after the Attorney General’s report discussed above,147 the Supreme Court,
in Universal Camera, provided a durable theoretical foundation for broadened
judicial review.148 Nevertheless, the notion that the decision of an administrative

143

Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 490.

144

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

145

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

146

See supra notes 93 –94 and accompanying text.

147

See supra notes 107– 41 and accompanying text.

148

Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 477:
Even though the whole record may have been canvassed in order to determine
whether the evidentiary foundation of a determination by the Board was
‘substantial,’ the phrasing of this Court’s process of review readily lent itself to
the notion that it was enough that the evidence supporting the Board’s result
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agency should be upheld if “supported by evidence” proved surprisingly durable,
a point that will be explored in the next Part.149

IV. Expertise as Rationale: Whither Deference?
Part III historically contextualized “substantial evidence” as a reaction to
the perceived rubber-stamping of early New Deal administrative agency factfinding.150 The next Part considers the question of deference in fact-finding more
generally.151 First, the Part suggests that minimal scrutiny of fact-finding may
be attributed to legislative confidence in the reliability of expert administrative
bodies operating in specialized factual areas.152 The Part moves on to observe
that Wyoming workers’ compensation administrative fact-finders are relatively
unspecialized, creating tension with the expertise justification for deference.153
The Part next acknowledges, however, that some jurisdictions have elected to
subject administrative fact-finding to minimal scrutiny by maintaining “any
evidence” standards of review.154 The Part concludes by discussing Missouri as
an analogy to Wyoming.155 While possessing an “overwhelming weight” standard
similar to Wyoming’s, the Missouri experience suggests, in context, that the
standard was meant to enlarge, rather than to restrict, the scope of judicial review
of administrative agencies.156 Missouri courts have now made it reasonably clear
that, notwithstanding the highly deferential review implied by the language of
the “overwhelming weight” standard, Missouri in practice applies whole-record,
substantial evidence review.157

A. “Supported by Evidence”: Trust in Expertise?
It might be wondered why a legislature could be content with a standard of
review requiring courts to uphold agency actions merely “supported by evidence.”
Courts generally understand that administrative agencies have special competence
and expertise to make factual determinations in specialized, technical areas of
was ‘substantial’ when considered by itself. If is fair to say that by imperceptible
steps regard for the fact-finding function of the Board led to the assumption
that the requirements of the Wagner Act were met when the reviewing court could
find in the record evidence which, when viewed in isolation, substantiated the
Board’s findings.
149

See infra notes 212–25 and accompanying text.

150

See supra notes 114–49 and accompanying text.

151

See infra notes 152–236 and accompanying text.

152

See infra notes 158–80 and accompanying text.

153

See infra notes 181–211 and accompanying text.

154

See infra notes 212–25 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 226–36 and accompanying text.

156

See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.

157

See infra notes 234–36 and accompanying text.
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law under the agencies’ organic statutes.158 In Brown, for example, the Wyoming
Supreme Court stated, “[w]e have indicated we defer to the experience and
expertise of the agency in its weighing of the evidence and will disturb its decisions
only where it is clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on
record.”159 One of the most consistently advanced reasons for courts deferring to
administrative agencies’ fact-finding centers on agency expertise.160 The judicial
rationale for qualifying an agency as “expert” is not, however, always clear. As a
commentator from the 1940s once observed:161
. . . [B]efore we can treat an expert as an expert we must be
sure of two things: First, the subject matter as to which he
expresses his opinion must be one with respect to which there
is conceded to be a specialized body of knowledge which can
be acquired only by study and training, and which is not
possessed by the ordinary run of men; Second, the knowledge
must be knowledge in a substantial sense. That is to say,
there must be some reasonably objective standard of certainty.
Absent this, there is, of course, no way in the world of knowing
whether the expert has any idea what he is talking about. A
physician is taken on faith because it is known from experience
that his judgments are susceptible of being tested and it is
assumed in the given case that they have been tested and their
validity indicated. An engineer is taken on faith because he deals
with matters of physics, which is among the exact sciences. But
no one takes on faith, except upon a frankly gambling basis,
an asserted “market expert” who professes to be able to predict
security prices. The contrast between the market expert and the
engineer is plain. The market expert has no reasonably objective
standard of certainty.162
Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as
Translation of Agency Science, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 733, 756 (2011) (“Coming on the heels of the
Lochner era, the post-New Deal period reflected an expertise model of administrative law. There
was, at this time, great faith in the ‘ability of experts to develop effective solutions to the economic
disruptions created by a market system.’ Indeed, economic regulations were the most common, such
as those governing ratemaking by railroads and utilities. Judicial review was characterized by great
deference on account of the agencies’ expertise.”) (internal citations omitted).
158

159
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991) (citing
Sw. Wyo. Rehab. Ctr. v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n of Wyo., 781 P.2d 918, 921 (Wyo. 1989); Cody Gas
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Wyo., 748 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo.1988)).
160
See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise,
and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 735, 740 (2002) (discussing the Court’s
veneration of agency expertise as a basis for judicial deference to agency “work product” in SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947)).
161

William J. Butler, The Rising Tide of Expertise, 15 Fordham L. Rev. 19, 23 (1946).

162

Id. at 34.
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Within the realm of workers’ compensation, one could reasonably expect an
agency to have expertise with respect to certain aspects of working conditions
and workplace hazards, or to common patterns of causation, or to the extent
of a worker’s incapacity. It is not, however, as easy to see why an agency should
be afforded deference with respect to, for example, non-demeanor credibility
determinations. A demeanor-based credibility determination, of course, involves
no more than an assessment of whether a witness is “telling the truth” in
connection with a particular, relevant fact. It is similar to the kind of finding that
trial courts routinely make, and a court is reluctant to disturb such a credibility
determination.163 A non-demeanor credibility determination, on the other
hand, involves not merely a determination as to whether, in context and based
on demeanor, a witness is telling the truth, but also whether the testimony is
logical and internally consistent.164 It is at least arguable that conclusions as to the
logic and consistency of testimony can be made as well, and perhaps better, from
outside the realm of expertise.165 The expert is no doubt the master of her field.166
But her conclusions are, in a sense, limited by the perspective of her field.167
Another qualification which the judgment of the expert must have is that it be
addressed to a problem which is solvable within his own field. Thus, the physician
is no expert when he advocates euthanasia. Nor is the engineer an expert on the
question whether a tunnel between Staten Island and Long Island is desirable.

James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 Cath. U. L. Rev. 903, 917 (2000) (“The
Anglo-American legal system, evolving out of the common law, generally requires live testimony by
the witness to allow the fact-finder to observe the demeanor and to assess the witness’s credibility.”).
163

164

Judge Frank once explained the distinction in a civil case reviewed in the Second Circuit:
We accept, as we must, those of the trial judge’s inferences of fact which he drew
directly from his estimates of the credibility of witnesses whom he observed as
they testified in his presence- i.e., his inferences (sometimes called ‘testimonial
inferences’) that certain facts existed because he believed some witness or witnesses
who testified before him that those facts did exist. We are not required, however, to
accept a trial judge’s findings, based not on facts to which a witness testified orally,
but only on secondary or derivative inferences from the facts which the trial judge
directly inferred from such testimony. We may disregard such a finding of facts
thus derivatively inferred, if other rational derivative inferences are open. And we
must disregard such a finding when the derivative inference either is not rational
or has but a flimsy foundation in the testimony.

Am. Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194 F.2d 449, 451 (2nd. Cir. 1951). In the context
of administrative agency review, it seems equally unjustified for courts to unflinchingly defer to
derivative inferences.
See Lynn McClain, Fact, Fiction and Proof in the 21st Century: Evidence and Credibility
for Fact Finding By Administrative Law Judges, NAALJ Annual Conference, Oct. 7, 2007, at
10–12, http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1881&context=all_fac (dis
cussing the willingness of appellate bodies to review factual findings based on the coherence of
witness testimony).
165

166

Id.

167

Id.
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No one doubts that the question involves some problems of engineering, but it
cannot be answered without solving a host of problems about which the engineer
knows no more than the ordinary citizen.168
Surprisingly, very little empirical work has been done to investigate whether
the “expertise hypothesis” is true.169 The reality is that, since the 1970s, there has
been increased public skepticism about the actual existence of agency expertise.170
One commentator described this skepticism as being a function of three factors:
the natural distrust of the American public of the whole idea of elite experts
running the government,171 “a public perception that administrative agencies are
in fact something less than expert,”172 and the possibility “that many Americans
have come to believe that a technical expertise is neither adequate nor appropriate
for the resolution of significant questions of public policy of the kind that
[legislatures] ha[ve] delegated regularly to administrative agencies.”173 Although
there is a historical understanding that non-expert generalists, and not specialists,
staff the upper echelons of agencies:174
[T]he continuing expertness of an administrative agency as to
matters of technical substance can be more properly understood
as deriving primarily from its staff, and not from the shifting
membership of those who temporarily serve as commissioners.
It is, indeed, the experience and specialization of a large and
dedicated staff that has permitted agencies to channel the diverse
expertise of many individuals into the process of institutional
decision-making—one of the unique contributions of the
modern administrative process.175
Thus, lower-level staff specialists are the actual accumulators of experience and:
“[C]umulative experience” begets understanding and insight by
which judgments not objectively demonstrable are validated or
qualified or invalidated. The constant process of trial and error,
Id. at 35. Similarly, why should Wyoming’s Medical Commission be deemed an “expert” in
connection with assessing whether a claimant is “really” looking for work? See infra notes 181–211
and accompanying text.
168

169
Joshua D. Wright & Angela M. Diveley, Do Expert Agencies Outperform Generalist Judges:
Some Preliminary Evidence from the Federal Trade Commission, 1 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
82, 88 (2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990034.
170
James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 Admin L. Rev. 363,
367–69 (1976).
171

Id. at 369–70.

172

Id. at 370–72.

173

Id. at 372–74.

174

Id. at 376.

175

Id.
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on a wider and fuller scale than a single adversary litigation
permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything else the
administrative from the judicial process.176
Of course, upper-level generalists have their part to play. “Thus, those who
point to the absence of a technical expertise in agency members may actually be
directing attention to an expertise of a different kind—an expertise in the art
of skepticism about expertise, a competence in the worldly art of the politically
acceptable and socially wise.”177 But to say experts should be balanced with
generalists does not mean that experts should be dispensed with altogether, for
nothing then remains of the original justification for court deferral to the factual
determinations of administrative agencies. In the end, legislatures likely assent
to minimal judicial scrutiny of agencies because they think agencies will get “it”
right, or are at least more likely to get “it” right than judges.178 This observation
introduces the difficulty inherent in de facto non-expert decision making. Suppose
neither the upper echelons of an administrative structure nor the staff level of
the agency are experts because there is not the kind of “continuing expertness”179
or “specialization of a large and dedicated staff ” that has come to characterize
the kind of administrative decision making to which, at least in theory, judicial
deference is owed.180

B. Non-Expert Decision Making
In addition to the previous section’s analysis regarding limitations in
the assumptions about expertise, it is also not always clear to what portions or
components of an agency a court is affording deference. In the workers’ compensation
context, for example, courts may potentially defer to fact experts—say, claims
processors, state average wage calculators, or benefit rate-setters; or to policy
generalists—say, agency heads (whether setting policy through rule making or
adjudication). Moreover, it is often not clear whether courts are deferring to
actual fact-finding, or to what in reality are mixed questions of fact and law.181
176

N.L.R.B. v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, Inc., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1952).

177

Freedman, supra note 170, at 377.

The best example of this intuition is when agencies are making findings “on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge.” See Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983) (deferring to Nuclear Regulatory Commission on licensure of nuclear power plants); Indus.
Union Dep’t., AFL-CIO v. Am. Petrol. Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (deferring to OSHA on
question of industrial carcinogens).
178

179

See supra notes 158–78 and accompanying text.

180

See supra notes 158–78 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of Am., Local Union No. 1 v. Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 182 (1971) (finding that when the National Labor Relations Board’s
holding in a case “depends on the application of law to facts, and the legal standard to be applied
is ultimately for the courts to decide and enforce.”). As Professor Mark Tushnet noted, the line
between facts and law has been a hazy one since the inception of the administrative state:
181
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In the traditional administrative structure involving implementation of workers’
compensation law and policy, implementation is more or less continuous.182
Minor officials make preliminary claims determinations and, subsequently,
higher officials and administrative adjudicators oversee those decisions as part
of a group effort.183 A great deal of closely and explicitly coordinated workers’
compensation-related effort goes exclusively into what is perceived as a unitary
administrative determination of claims eligibility or ineligibility.184 Small wonder
that the judiciary may be reluctant to disturb decision making resulting from this
kind of coordinated (and presumably self-correcting) effort, particularly where an
agency has been doing much the same kind of work for a long period of time.185
The conceptual difficulty with affording the Wyoming workers’ compensation
administrative system judicial deference is that agency activity therein often
does not closely resemble sustained, specialized agency action—especially prior

. . . [A]s John Dickinson had urged in his 1927 treatise on administrative law, the
distinction between facts and law was vague, and drawing it inevitably implicated
the very policy questions that Progressive theorists believed the agencies themselves
should decide. For Dickinson, it was impossible “to establish a clear line between
so-called ‘questions of law’ and ‘questions of fact’ by any substantive test of
definition.” Rather, “[A]ny factual state or relation which the courts . . . regard
as sufficiently important to be made decisive for all subsequent cases of similar
character becomes thereby a matter of law . . . ” Administrative agencies applied
general standards to “bridge[] th[e] gap” between “the special subsidiary facts . . .
and the ultimate conclusion.”
Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of Progressive
Legal Theory, 60 Duke L. J. 1565, 1585 (2011) (quoting John Dickinson, Administrative Justice
and The Supremacy of Law in The United States 312, 315 (1927)).
182
See, e.g., 452 Mass. Code Regs. 1.00 (2017) et seq. (Adjudicatory Rules of the Industrial
Accident Board).
183

Id.

184

Id.

Something of this principle was captured in the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). There, the Court upheld a disapproval by
the Securities and Exchange Commission of a reorganization plan that would permit management
to trade in certain securities during the reorganization. Id. In response to the argument, that neither
the relevant statute nor an agency rule precluded such trading, the Court said:
185

Drawing upon its experience, the Commission indicated that [the] normal and
special powers of the holding company management during the course of a . . .
reorganization placed in the management’s command ‘a formidable battery of
devices that would enable it, if it should choose to use them selfishly, to affect
in material degree the ultimate allocation of new securities among the various
existing classes, to influence the market for its own gain and to manipulate or
obstruct the reorganization required by the mandate of the statute.’
Id. at 204. Among the reasons cited by the Court for permitting such an outcome was that “the
problem may be so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the
boundaries of a general rule.” Id. at 203. Thus, a rational decision based solely on agency expertise
may be permissible and even necessary. Id.
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to a dispute ripening to a “contested case,”186 but even thereafter.187 One might
conceive of the system as “intermittently” administrative. The Division of Workers’
Compensation, for example, is a relatively recent creation under Wyoming law.
It was not until the mid-1980s that the Wyoming legislature conferred on the
Division partial centralized control of claims processing. The centralization of
claims processing in the Division was not accomplished until 1996.188
Either hearing officers of the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH)189 or the
Medical Commission hear contested cases.190 OAH hearing officers issue decisions
in workers’ compensation, drivers’ license, Department of Family Services’ child
abuse/neglect central registry, and state employee personnel cases.191 In addition,
OAH Hearing Officers have heard cases referred by Professional Licensing Boards,
the Departments of Agriculture, Education, Environmental Quality, Family
Services, Game and Fish, Health, Revenue, Transportation, and Workforce
Services.192 In Fiscal Year 2016, OAH handled nearly twice as many drivers’ license
hearings as workers’ compensation hearings.193 In sum, it is very difficult to escape
the conclusion that the OAH is something less than an “expert” administrative
agency.194 Strictly speaking, it is not even a workers’ compensation agency.195
Under Wyoming law, a contested case is defined as “a proceeding including but not
restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a
party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing . . . .”
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(ii) (2017).
186

187
The Office of Administrative Hearings is by statute an independent agency and not
statutorily limited to hearing workers’ compensation cases. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-602(a)
(2017) (the Wyoming workers’ compensation statute) (referencing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2201(a)
(2017) (“The office of administrative hearings is created as a separate operating agency . . .”)).
188
George Santini, The Breaking of a Compromise: An Analysis of Wyoming Workers’ Compensa
tion Legislation, 1986-1997, 33 Land & Water L. Rev. 489, 517 (1998) (citing 1996 Wyo. Sess.
Laws ch. 82, § 4); see also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-802 (Michie 1997).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-2201. Prior to the establishment of the OAH, cases were tried
to independent hearing officers, and before that, directly to district court judges. See Santini, supra
note 188, at 497–504.
189

190

Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-601–602, 27-14-616 (2017).

See 2016 Wyo. Off. Admin. Hearing Ann. Rep. at 2, http://oah.wyo.gov; see also Santini,
supra note 188, at 505 n.31.
191

192

See 2016 Wyo. Off. Admin. Hearing Ann. Rep. at 2, http://oah.wyo.gov.

193

Id.

The agency has extremely limited resources, employing only six full-time and four parttime hearing officers as of 2016. See id.
194

195
If the expertise discussion extends to the level of the Division of Wyoming Workers’
Compensation, matters become even murkier. Historically, a number of the Division’s functions
have even been privatized. Santini, supra note 188, at 506. It is obviously difficult to speak of a
court’s deferring to private entities. Nevertheless, the first enactment of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act, in Ch. 108 Session Laws of Wyoming, § 12(c)–(d) (1965) authorized the use by
agencies of “Auxiliary Personnel,” presiding officers lent either by the Attorney General or other
agencies. There is no indication in the legislative history whether questions of expertise were
considered during the enactment of these provisions. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101 (2017) et seq.
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The lack of focus militates against the notion of expertise. As commentators
have noted:
[E]xpertness . . . springs only from that continuity of interest,
that ability and desire to devote fifty-two weeks a year, year
after year, to a particular problem. . . [T]he art of regulating
an industry requires knowledge of the details of its operation,
ability to shift requirements as the condition of the industry may
dictate, the pursuit of energetic measures upon the appearance
of an emergency, and the power through enforcement to realize
conclusions as to policy.196
The lack of any intermediate administrative review exacerbates the limitations
of the OAH structure. Specialist appellate administrative review might help to
rectify deficiencies in fact-finding by quasi-generalist workers’ compensation
hearing officers. However, decisions of the hearing officers are appealed to the
Wyoming district courts,197 which review agency fact-finding under the substantial
evidence standard, which of course returns to the problem of what substantial
evidence means.198
Deference to the findings of the Medical Commission presents a different kind
of problem. There is no question that the Medical Commission possesses medical
expertise.199 The question is whether the findings of the Medical Commission
should be afforded deference outside the arena of medical expertise.200 The
Moss case provides an excellent example of how medical findings can intrude
on other kinds of determinations. The Commission believed the claimant was
exaggerating his claims of pain.201 But the Commission’s expertise appears limited
See Tushnet, supra note 181 (quoting James M. Landis, The Administrative Process
23–24 (1938)).
196

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-612 (2017). Review by the Wyoming Supreme Court of
decisions of the district courts is de novo. Dutcher v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp.
Div., 2010 WY 10, ¶ 9, 223 P.3d 559, 561 (Wyo. 2010); Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY
84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008). The evidentiary review by the district court is under Wyo.
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(2)(E) (2017) pursuant to Wyo. R. App. P. 12.09(a) (2017).
197

198

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(2)(E).

199

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616(a):
The medical commission is created to consist of eleven (11) health care providers
appointed by the governor as follows:
(i) Seven (7) licensed physicians appointed from a list of not less than fourteen
(14) nominees submitted by the Wyoming Medical Society;
(ii) Four (4) health care providers appointed from a list of not less than eight
(8) nominees developed and submitted by appropriate health care provider
groups selected by the director.

200

See supra note 196 and accompanying text.

See Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶¶ 29–42, 232
P.3d 1, 9–11 (Wyo. 2010).
201
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to an affirmation of the inability to establish a medical basis for a complaint of
pain.202 The additional inference that a claimant must, accordingly, be fabricating
complaints of pain does not appear entitled to deference. Justice Kite’s analysis
revealed the limitations in affording a specialized body wide latitude in factfinding beyond its domain of expertise. For this reason, referral to the original
fact-finder is preferable to conferring overall final hearing authority on the
Medical Commission.203
Thus, in Wyoming one has a lower level claims processing “Division”
that is of relatively recent vintage; an Office of Administrative Hearings that
is not exclusively devoted to workers’ compensation matters; and a Medical
Commission presumably intended to hear medical disputes, but which by statute
is required to stray beyond that focused task to consider nonmedical issues in
workers’ compensation disputes.204 The Wyoming courts may have no choice but
to defer to decisions rendered by such a fractured administrative structure, but the
“expertise theory” would be a difficult basis upon which to do so. The situation is
reminiscent of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act’s split enforcement
arrangement in which:
Congress separated enforcement and rulemaking powers from
adjudicative powers, assigning these respective functions to
two independent administrative authorities. The purpose
of this ‘split enforcement’ structure was to achieve a greater
separation of functions than exists within the traditional ‘unitary’
agency, which under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
generally must divide enforcement and adjudication between
separate personnel.205
202

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-616(b)(iv):
The division shall refer medically contested cases to the commission for hearing
by a medical hearing panel. The decision to refer a contested case to the office of
administrative hearings or a medical hearing panel established under this section
shall not be subject to further administrative review. Following referral by the
division, the hearing examiner or medical hearing panel shall have jurisdiction to
hear and decide all issues related to the written notice of objection . . .

The Commission’s mandate is not, accordingly, limited to ruling upon medical evidence. See id.
203
The proposition has been well established in workers’ compensation cases, in which
medical evidence is supplied by parties, that an administrative agency may distinguish between
medical facts and “the existence, causation or consequences of various injuries or diseases can rest
upon something other than direct medical testimony,” such as “the practical schooling that comes
with years of handling similar cases.” Larson, supra note 13, at § 128.01. The difficulty with a state
medical administrative commission is that there is puzzling conflation between medical opinion
and administrative fact-finding. See id. For this reason, all other states leave ultimate fact finding in
the hands of the workers’ compensation official, who is either permitted or required to accept only
the purely medical findings of the independent medical fact finder. Id; see also Michael C. Duff,
Workers’ Compensation Law 255–58 (Carolina Academic Press 2017).
204

See supra note 202.

205

Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1971).
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Here, enforcement has been split three ways.206 In Martin Occupational Safety
and Health Rev. Comm’n,207 the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that deference was
due to the portion of the split agency, the non-adjudicative branch headed by the
Secretary of Labor rather than the adjudicative branch called “the Commission,”
because “Congress intended to delegate to the Commission the type of nonpolicymaking adjudicatory powers typically exercised by a court in the agencyreview context.”208 But in Wyoming, the Division’s Director possesses plenary
workers’ compensation rulemaking authority;209 the Medical Commission has a
wide range of rulemaking powers;210 and the Wyoming courts de facto afford the
Office of Administrative Hearings and the Division of Workers’ Compensation—
as this article argues—a form of hyper-deference. Unlike the situation under
OSHA, in which the Secretary possessed historical familiarity and policymaking
expertise, the workers’ compensation system has been in a state of considerable
flux since its emergence from a court-based system in 1986.211

C. “Any Evidence” Jurisdictions
Fact-finding not undertaken by experts may contain a variety of errors; but
to the extent that a jurisdiction believes most such errors will be harmless, it may
consciously eschew more modern developments and prefer to adopt a standard
of review upholding agency decisions supported by any evidence. In the words of
Larson’s Treatise, a widely-respected authority on workers’ compensation doctrine:
A finding of fact based on no evidence is an error of law.
Accordingly, in compensation law, as in all administrative law,
an award may be reversed if not supported by any evidence.
Conversely, since the compensation Board has expressly been
entrusted with the power to find the facts, its fact findings must
be affirmed if supported by any evidence, even if the reviewing
court thinks the evidence points the other way. This statement
is, without any close competition, the number one cliché of
compensation law and occurs in some form in the first paragraph
of compensation opinions almost as a matter of course.212

206

See supra notes 186–90 and accompanying text.

207

Martin, 499 U.S. at 144.

208

Id. at 154.

209

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-802 (2017).

See Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-616(b)(i) (health care procedures and treatment), 616(b)(ii)
(criteria for certification of temporary total disability), 616(b)(vi) (firefighter presumption procedures).
210

211

Martin, 499 U.S. at 153.

Larson, supra note 13, at § 130.01. The statement seems too sweeping. See id. To begin
with, it would eclipse the substantial evidence rule in jurisdictions, applying it under traditional
administrative law codes, which is the main point of this article. See id.
212
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There are two problems worth mentioning regarding this formulation, one
a logical problem and the second a historical problem. First, as a matter of logic,
it does not follow that because a decision based on no evidence is unsupportable,
a decision based on any evidence is supportable. Furthermore, the illogic of the
proposition dovetails into the second historical problem. As previously discussed,
the general, historical movement in administrative law has been in exactly the
opposite direction: any evidence (similar to the “supported by evidence” standard
in the prior Wagner Act) is not enough.213 Courts have, as a matter of conscience,
chosen not to uphold agency decisions that cannot be upheld on review of the
whole record.214
A jurisdiction could, of course, deliberately choose to follow a different
course. A state might purposefully render it “permissible for courts to determine
the substantiality of evidence supporting [an administrative agency] decision
merely on the basis of evidence which, in and of itself, justified it, without
taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting
inferences could be drawn . . .”, whatever one might think of the idea on policy
grounds.215 Larson’s Treatise nevertheless seems mistaken when it equates the
evidentiary phrases “any evidence,” “some evidence,” “any credible evidence,”
“substantial evidence,” and “supported by evidence . . .”.216 Certainly an “any
evidence” standard, apparently embraced by Georgia and perhaps others,
would suggest a legislative determination that the smallest conceivable positive
quantum of evidence be permitted to support an administrative, workers’

213

See supra notes 114– 49 and accompanying text.

As Justice Frankfurter recounted in Universal Camera, the legislative history of, in particular,
the Taft- Hartley Act, made clear that courts were expected to exercise their conscience even within
the confines of deferential review standards:
214

The ‘substantial evidence’ rule set forth in section 10(e) is exceedingly important.
As a matter of language, substantial evidence would seem to be an adequate
expression of law. The difficulty comes about in the practice of agencies to rely
upon (and of courts to tacitly approve) something less—to rely upon suspicion,
surmise, implications, or plainly incredible evidence. It will be the duty of the
courts to determine in the final analysis and in the exercise of their independent
judgment, whether on the whole record the evidence in a given instance is
sufficiently substantial to support a finding, conclusion, or other agency action
as a matter of law. In the first instance, however, it will be the function of the
agency to determine the sufficiency of the evidence upon which it acts—and the
proper performance of its public duties will require it to undertake this inquiry in
a careful and dispassionate manner. Should these objectives of the bill as worded
fail, supplemental legislation will be required.
Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 484 n.17 (1951).
215

Id. at 487.

216

Larson, supra note 13, at § 130.01[3].
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compensation decision. 217 That is not, however, Wyoming’s law,218 nor a fair
rendering of the substantial evidence standard in many states regulated by modern
administrative codes.219
Illinois provides an interesting parallel. Apparently, beginning in about the
early 1980s, Illinois courts began to uphold decisions of that state’s Industrial
Commission when “not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”220
Furthermore, “a factual finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence
only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent.”221 In a process similar to the
Wyoming experience, Illinois courts drew the “opposite conclusion” standard—
as this article will term the Illinois standard—from an area of law unrelated to
workers’ compensation, in the case of Illinois, from zoning.222 The “opposite
conclusion” (Illinois) and the “overwhelming weight” (Wyoming) standards
both appear excessively deferential. The distinction is that in Illinois, courts

217
In reviewing the Larson treatise digest’s footnote cases in § 130.01[3] n.14, it is difficult
to agree that there is a broad swath of “any evidence” administrative law cases. Id. at § 130.01[3]
n.14. Only cases from Georgia are cited. Id. The treatise digest’s “supported by evidence” footnote
cases, in § 130.01[3] n.17, include authority from Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Texas. Id. at
§ 130.01[3] n.17 (citing Pate v. Hook, 557 S.W.2d 391 (Ark. 1977) (cannot “substitute judgment”
citation to “substantial evidence” jury case); Tackett v. Sizemore Mining Co., 560 S.W.2d 17 (Ky.
1977) (“ample” medical evidence); Trane Co. v. Morrison, 566 S.W.2d 849 (Tenn. 1978) (“material”
evidence supported civil court trial judge’s decree); Abeyta v. Travelers Ins. Co., 566 S.W.2d 708
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (ample evidence); Ramirez v. Nat’l. Standard Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 837
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (evidence sufficient to support jury finding); Whaley v. Transp. Ins. Co.,
559 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref ’d n.r.e.) (jury finding not manifestly unjust)). A
number of these cases are not administrative law cases, so they have limited applicability to workers’
compensation cases decided in administrative law systems, which is now almost universally the case.
See id. The same Larson’s treatise section cites a United States Supreme Court case, Del Vecchio v.
Bowers, 296 U.S. 280 (1935), for the proposition that “substantial evidence” is not a larger quantity
than “any evidence.” Id. This very old case (pre-Universal Camera) is inapposite because it arose
under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Act and applied to the quantum of evidence requisite to
rebut a firm statutory presumption of coverage, which is a different evidentiary question in a quite
dissimilar statutory regime. See id.
218
Whatever else may be said about Wyoming’s inconsistent substantial evidence jurisprudence,
it remains abundantly clear that substantial evidence means at least “such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Baker v. Wyo. Dep’t. of
Workforce Services, 2017 WY 60, ¶ 7, 395 P.3d 1095, 1098 (Wyo. 2017).
219
See, e.g., Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty, Inc., 799 S.E.2d 304, 305 (S.C. 2017) (“Substantial
evidence is ‘not a mere scintilla of evidence nor the evidence viewed blindly from one side of the
case, but is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would allow reasonable minds to
reach the conclusion that [the commission] reached or must have reached’ to support its orders.”).

Kirkwood v. Indus. Comm’n, 416 N.E.2d 1078, 1078 (Ill. 1981). One may note here the
similarity between this standard and the position selected by the dissenters in the Attorney General’s
Report, but rejected by the Committee majority. See id.
220

221
Steel & Mach. Transp., Inc. v. Ill. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 33 N.E.3d 674, 683
(Ill. 2015).

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Indus. Comm’n, 591 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ill. 1992) (workers’ compen
sation) (citing Drogos v. Bensenville, 426 N.E.2d 1276 (Ill. 1981) (zoning)).
222
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utilizing the “opposite conclusion” standard very rarely purport to be applying
the substantial evidence standard while simultaneously applying the “opposite
conclusion” standard. On the contrary, it does not appear that in workers’
compensation cases the Illinois Supreme Court has applied any variant of the
traditional substantial evidence standard in recent history.223
Consequently, as this section demonstrates, some states have created legal
paradigms that are unusually deferential to workers’ compensation administrative
decision making.224 Others, to be sure, have held fast to the actual substantial
evidence standard.225 Presumably, rationales for insulating the decision making of
administrative agencies may be grounded in expertise, in efficiency, or in both.

D. Missouri Constitutional Development
Missouri appears to apply a standard of review very similar—at least in
its explicit phraseology—to the Wyoming “overwhelming weight” standard.
In Missouri:
A court must examine the whole record to determine if it contains
sufficient competent and substantial evidence to support the
award, i.e., whether the award is contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence . . . Whether the award is supported by
competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining
the evidence in the context of the whole record. An award that
is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in
context, not supported by competent and substantial evidence.226
Logically, the Missouri language could mean that the only time a workers’
compensation award does not contain sufficient competent and substantial
evidence to support an award is when it is contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence. On the other hand, the language could mean that one clear
case of an award not being supported by competent and substantial evidence is
For example, “such evidence as a reasonable mind could accept.” See supra note 14 and
accompanying text. The author traced Illinois cases back to 2000, but could not find any articulation
of the rule.
223

224
See, e.g., In re Wadsworth’s Case, 963 N.E. 2d 1181, 1187 (Mass. 2012) (“We review a
board’s decision regarding workers’ compensation benefits under the usual standard for appeal from
a final decision of an administrative agency . . . except that we do not review whether the board’s
decision was supported by substantial evidence . . . In the context of this case, we may reverse or
modify the board’s decision where it is based on an error of law, or is arbitrary or capricious.”).

JP’s Landscaping v. Labor Comm’n, 397 P.3d 728, 734 (Utah Ct. App. 2017) (“An
administrative law decision meets the substantial evidence test when a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate the evidence supporting the decision.”).
225

Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 222–23 (Mo. 2003) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
226
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when it is contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The two readings
are not equivalent, for the first plainly limits the scope of judicial review while the
second is not limiting to the same degree.
Unlike the situation in Wyoming, the substantial evidence standard in
Missouri has an explicitly constitutional origin. “The Missouri Constitution,
article V, section 18, provides for judicial review of the [workers’ compensation]
commission’s award to determine whether the award is “supported by competent
and substantial evidence upon the whole record.”227 It may seem unusual to see
judicial review standards specified in a state constitutional amendment. The
development may perhaps be explained by the practice that had emerged in the
Missouri courts during the 1930s and 1940s. Throughout that period, courts
evidently reviewed agency adjudications like jury findings; a practice the public
apparently found objectionable:
Passing therefore to the question of [appellate review], it must
be borne in mind that the Commission’s finding stands on the
same basis as the verdict of a jury in ordinary civil actions. . . .
[T]he award is [therefore] conclusive on appeal to the circuit
court, and also on appeal to this court, if there is any evidence
before the Commission to support the award.228
The Missouri courts, in other words, appeared to equate review of agency
factual findings with extremely deferential review of jury factual findings.229 The
constitutional amendment, referenced above, “worked a change in the scope
of review and the effect to be attributed to findings of fact by the Industrial
Commission.”230 According to the Missouri Supreme Court:
[T]his stated minimum standard (‘supported by competent
and substantial evidence upon the whole record’) is mandatory
and requires no legislation to put it into effect. This does not
mean that the reviewing court may substitute its own judgment
on the evidence for that of the administrative tribunal. But it
does authorize it to decide whether such tribunal could have
reasonably made its findings, and reached its result, upon
consideration of all of the evidence before it; and to set aside
decisions clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the

227

Id. at 222.

Davis v. Research Med. Ctr., 903 S.W.2d 557, 563 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995), rev’d, 121 S.W.
3d 220 (Mo. 2003) (quoting Carter v. Priebe & Sons, 77 S.W.2d 171, 174 (Mo. App. 1934)).
228

229
Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 563. A very similar phenomenon transpired in Wyoming. See infra
notes 237–331 and accompanying text.
230

Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 563.
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evidence. Of course, the reviewing court should adhere to the
rule of deference to findings, involving credibility of witnesses,
made by those before whom the witnesses gave oral testimony.231
Thus, the “overwhelming weight” standard in Missouri was likely meant
to enlarge, not to diminish, the scope of judicial review, and, significantly, the
Missouri Supreme Court simultaneously made direct reference to parallel
contemporary developments in the enactments of both the Missouri and federal
Administrative Procedure Acts.232
Still, the “overwhelming weight” standard had the same rhetorical tension in
Missouri as this article contends it has, presently, in Wyoming. Thus, the Missouri
courts began to construct a complicated, two-step analysis when engaging in
judicial review of administrative action:
First, the reviewing court examines the record, together
with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence
therein, in the light most favorable to the findings and award
of the Commission to determine whether they are supported
by competent and substantial evidence. If so, the reviewing
court must then determine whether the Commission’s findings
and award, even if supported by some competent substantial
evidence, were nevertheless clearly contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence contained in the whole record before
the Commission.233
It is not surprising that a standard both requiring that an agency’s decision be
reasonable and suggesting that agency awards might only be set aside when “clearly
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence” could create confusion (as
it has in Wyoming). In Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, the Missouri Supreme
Court clarified, “[t]here is nothing in the constitution or section 287.495.1 that
requires a reviewing court to view the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the award.”234 Ultimately, “[w]hether the
231

Wood v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 197 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Mo. 1946).

232

Id. at 674.

233

Davis, 903 S.W.2d at 565.

Hampton v. Big Boy Steel Erection, 121 S.W.3d 220, 223 (Mo. 2003). The relevant
judicial review of administrative agency action provision states:
234

The court, on appeal, shall review only questions of law and may modify, reverse,
remand for rehearing, or set aside the award upon any of the following grounds
and no other: (1) That the commission acted without or in excess of its powers;
(2) That the award was procured by fraud; (3) That the facts found by the
commission do not support the award; (4) That there was not sufficient competent
evidence in the record to warrant the making of the award.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.495 (2017).
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award is supported by competent and substantial evidence is judged by examining
the evidence in the context of the whole record. An award that is contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence is, in context, not supported by competent
and substantial evidence.”235 Certainly, an award against the overwhelming weight
of the evidence is not supported by competent and substantial evidence—but
the touchstone of the Hampton review is its endorsement of the “whole record,”
conscientious spirit of Universal Camera.236

V. A Proposal: Choose or Explain?
In Wyoming, the “overwhelming weight” and substantial evidence standards
are in significant, rhetorical tension, just as similar standards were once in
tension in Missouri, until the Missouri Supreme Court decided Hampton.237 The
“overwhelming weight” standard suggests minimal—perhaps the bare minimum—
judicial scrutiny.238 Substantial evidence, however, suggests a “conscientious”
review of the entire adjudicative record.239 The article will proceed to argue that
the Wyoming Supreme Court should apply the actual substantial evidence rule,
unmoored from the confusing and unnecessary overwhelming weight rhetoric.
The Court should follow Hampton’s lead in making clear that there is nothing
in Wyoming law that “requires a reviewing court to view the evidence and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the award.”240
At a minimum, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court should clearly explain
any intentional analytical distinction between the standards, if any there be, so
that the relationship between the formulations is understood by litigants.

A. State Historical and Constitutional Considerations
Concerns over purported judicial rubber stamping of National Labor
Relations Board decisions generated the history surrounding the substantial
evidence rule.241 While the federal labor law context surrounding those decisions,
and decisions involving other federal New Deal subjects in the era, were important,
there is something different about state-based administrative adjudication of
workers’ compensation claims.242 Significantly, state workers’ compensation law
pre-dates federal administrative law. Most state workers’ compensation statutes

235

Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223.

236

See supra note 214 and accompanying text.

237

Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223.

238

See supra note 15 and accompanying text.

239

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).

240

See Hampton, 121 S.W.3d at 223.

241

See supra notes 129– 49 and accompanying text.

242

See supra notes 129– 49 and accompanying text.
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were firmly in place by the 1920s.243 Thus, judicial review of the findings of
these nascent state administrative agencies preceded the coming of the federal
administrative state in the early 1930s.244 In short, there would have been limited
federal administrative law to shape state administrative law, either through
acceptance or rejection of the federal model.245
In Wyoming, it has been generally understood that citizens have a fundamental
right to access courts to assert a claim for personal injury.246 Furthermore, the
courts will subject governmental impingements on that right to strict scrutiny.247
It follows from this that administrative workers’ compensation claims, as
substitutes for common law tort suits, function as poor candidates for minimal
scrutiny by the courts. It is one thing for the system to permit a substantive
quid pro quo premised on an adequate exchange of rights; it is quite another
to surrender meaningful judicial review of “tort-substitute” cases in the bargain.
Neither does it seem likely that a system born in times preceding sophisticated
justification for the administrative state would have contemplated surrender of
fundamental rights premised on administrative policy justifications.
While the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that “the worker’s compensa
tion system is not a tort-based system but is, instead, based upon contract,” such a
formulation is somewhat misleading.248 The court’s formulation underscores that

243
John F. Witt, The Accidental Republic: Crippled Workingmen, Destitute Widows,
And the Remaking of American Law 10 (2004).
244
It is true, of course, that federal agencies already existed in this period, and notable
examples included the Federal Trade Commission, created in 1915, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission, created in 1887. See Timeline of Federal History, Society for History in the Federal
Government, http://shfg.org/shfg/programs/resources/timeline-of-federal-history/. (last visited
Nov. 14, 2017). However, there was no formally agreed-upon federal code to which the scattered
agencies were bound or to which state agencies might have referred for even informal guidance.
Martin Shapiro, A Golden Anniversary?: The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 19 Regulation
40 (1996) (“Before the APA, Congress usually would spell out the procedures for rulemaking for
particular acts and agencies. There seemed to be little need for special administrative law. But
whenever Congress did not explicitly provide a rulemaking procedure for an agency, uncertainty
arose over what type of approach would be appropriate.”).
245

Tushnet describes the situation just before the 1920s in the following terms:
Agency proceedings might move more quickly to an acceptable conclusion than
judicial ones. Coming to terms with regulatory agencies meant accepting some
departures from the procedures used in the ordinary courts, but not departures
that were too substantial. Hewing closely to ordinary courts’ procedures had the
added advantage of giving the lawyers who represented businesses in court the
opportunity to extend their representation to administrative agencies.

Tushnet, supra note 181 at 1592–93.
246

See Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48, 54 (Wyo. 1992).

247

Id.

In re Perry, 2006 WY 61, ¶ 22, 134 P.3d 1242, 1249 (Wyo. 2006) (citing In re Injury to
Spera, 713 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Wyo. 1986)).
248
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the original quid pro quo was in the nature of a social contract.249 But the rights
authorized to be exchanged derived from the Wyoming Constitution, which has
always stated, “[n]o law shall be enacted limiting the amount of damages to be
recovered for causing the injury or death of any person.”250 Furthermore, the
Constitution continues to state, “[a]ny contract or agreement with any employee
waiving any right to recover damages for causing the death or injury of any
employee shall be void.”251 Thus, workers’ compensation would in all likelihood
have been unconstitutional without the Wyoming Constitutional amendment
permitting it.252 Furthermore, “[a]mount of damages to be recovered for causing
the injury or death of any person” sounds in tort, not contract. As commentator
George Santini has expressed the notion:
[T]he original worker’s compensation law concept is in the form
of a trade-off in which the employees, in exchange for giving up
their common law rights of recovery against their employers for
work related injuries, receive certain limited benefits regardless
of fault. Employers, in exchange for funding the worker’s
compensation system, receive immunity from lawsuits brought
on behalf of injured workers. Both sides recognized that the
“blood of the workman” was the cost of production and that
industry should bear the charge.253
Of course, if there were no underlying theory for liability in connection with
“the blood of the workman,” there would be no occasion for an exchange,
however characterized.
The tort-contract distinction is significant. A contractual dispute between
commercial actors has long seemed tailor-made for binding private determination
by a fact-finder, for example.254 One simply ascertains the meaning of a (typically)
written instrument, often with an eye to the Uniform Commercial Code.255
To state the obvious, a statutory right is different. Contracting parties have a
constitutional right to the non-impairment of their contracts by the State, of
course, but they have no constitutional right to the substance of their agreement.
The Wyoming courts vaguely suggest, by using the rhetoric of contract, that
249

See generally Fishback & Kantor, supra note 25.

250

Wyo. Const. art. 10, § 4(a).

251

Id. § 4(c).

252

Id.

253

Santini, supra note 188, at 493.

See generally Charles Newton Hulvey, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes, 15 Va. L. Rev.
238 (1929) (canvassing the arbitration of commercial disputes in the 1920s).
254

Daniel G. Collins, Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 736,
750–51 (1966) (arguing that even where the Uniform Commercial Code is not expressly referenced
in arbitration agreement, its provisions implicitly guide the resolution of commercial disputes).
255
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a workers’ compensation claim is akin to a routine, non-statutory commercial
dispute.256 It is hard to agree with the suggestion, for there is remedial substance in
the employer-injured employee relationship. Under the Wyoming Constitution,
an injured worker’s damages may not be legislatively limited except by operation
of the workers’ compensation system.257 In light of this very explicit limitation,
the Act should not be read to have somehow impliedly repealed a right to judicial
review appropriate to issues involving modification of fundamental rights.

B. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act
The Wyoming legislature enacted the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act in 1965,258 and based it upon the Revised Model State Administrative
Procedure Act.259 “Both the Wyoming Act and the Model Act have much
in common with the Federal Administrative Procedure Act.”260 In a 1962
symposium issue of the University of Wyoming Law Journal, commentators, at a
time just preceding the enactment of the Wyoming APA, wrote on various aspects
of the then-draft statute, including the appropriate scope of judicial review of
administrative agency adjudication.261 As one commentator at the symposium
remarked, noting the Wyoming courts’ inconsistency in using the substantial
evidence rule to review administrative agency adjudications prior to 1961:
The court may have more faith in the judgment of one agency
than in another. At any rate the court is not consistent in this
area, and an attorney in Wyoming will have to be aware of
this unless and until the issue is finally settled either by decision
or by the enactment of a State Administrative Procedure Act
or otherwise.262
As part of the 1962 symposium, Professor Bloomenthal of the University of
Wyoming College of Law underscored many of the issues that have been under
discussion in this article:
In terms of application of the substantial evidence rule, our
Court, influenced somewhat by concepts pertaining to judicial
256

See supra note 248 and accompanying text.

257

See supra note 250 and accompanying text.

David H. Carmichael & David R. Nicholas, The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, 1
Land & Water L. Rev. 497, 497 (1966).
258

259

Id.

260

Id.

Harold S. Bloomenthal, Administrative Law in Wyoming – An Introduction and Preliminary
Report, 16 Wyo. L. J. 191, 213–14 (1962); Bobbie J. Baker, Scope of Judicial Review, 16 Wyo. L. J.
191, 326–35 (1962).
261

262

Baker, supra note 261, at 329.
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review in appellate court actions, has talked about the necessity
of viewing the case only as if the evidence most favorable to the
decision should be considered in isolation. This approach on the
federal level was the subject of considerable criticism that led to
the adoption of the requirement that the administrative decision
be based on substantial evidence as determined from the entire
record and the reviewing court must take into consideration
not only the favorable evidence but also any other evidence in
the record that detracts therefrom. It is recommended that any
proposed statute incorporate this requirement as does the Model
Act which provides for review of decisions in the light of “the
whole record.”263
The eventual text of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is very
similar to the federal Administrative Procedure Act in defining the scope of factual
review in terms of substantial evidence. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act requires state courts to “[h]old unlawful and set aside agency action, findings
and conclusions found to be . . . [u]nsupported by substantial evidence in a case
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”264 The federal
Administrative Procedure Act requires federal courts to “hold unlawful and set
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . unsupported by
substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title [the
adjudication sections of the APA] or otherwise reviewed on the record of an
agency hearing provided by statute . . .”265 As discussed previously, the federal APA
substantial evidence rule is identical to the provision under the Taft-Hartley Act,
and contemporary analysts understood it to be more expansive than “viewing the
case only as if the evidence most favorable to the decision should be considered
in isolation.”266 To the extent the Wyoming legislature meant the Wyoming
Administrative Procedure Act to incorporate a similar idea of substantial evidence,
the “overwhelming weight” review differs significantly from then-contemporary
understandings of judicial review under the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act.267

C. Dale v. S & S Builders: Sound Judgment as a “Fairly Sturdy Standard”?
It is notable that in a relatively recent discussion of the substantial evidence
rule, in Dale v. S & S Builders, the Wyoming Supreme Court undertook an
analysis of the relationship between the substantial evidence rule and the arbitrary

263

Bloomenthal, supra note 261, at 213–14.

264

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (2017).

265

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).

266

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.

267

See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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and capricious standard of review without considering the internal incongruity
of Wyoming substantial evidence review itself. 268 The facts of the case were
straightforward: a truck driver-heavy equipment operator with preexisting right
knee injuries suffered a cut during a fall on a restricted-duty job.269 There was
conflicting evidence as to whether the cut was a “scrape” or a “wound,”270 but
in any event the driver-operator developed a staph infection.271 The Wyoming
Workers’ Compensation Division accepted the claim initially, but then
rejected it.272
The hearing officer ruled the worker “had not met his burden of proving the
infection was causally related to his work-related injury . . .”273 On appeal, there
was a good deal of disagreement about the standard of review that applied.274 To
understand the problem, imagine a case: X vs. Y. X has the burden of proof and
presents evidence. Y presents no evidence. If the agency finds for Y, because it was
not persuaded by X’s evidence, was the ultimate decision based on “substantial
evidence”? The Wyoming courts, in particular the court in Newman v. Wyoming
Workers’ Safety & Compensation Division,275 had followed Pennsylvania law in
concluding that the situation was sufficiently awkward that a different standard
of evidentiary review, “arbitrary and capricious,” should apply.276 The Wyoming
Supreme Court deemed the arbitrary and capricious standard to apply “when
there is no disputed evidence on an issue because the substantial evidence test
is awkward when applied to a finding for the non-burdened party.”277 The
awkwardness of applying the substantial evidence standard in such circumstances
does not, however, explain resorting to the arbitrary and capricious standard. As
the Newman Court assessed the situation:
[E]ven if the factual findings are found to be supported by
substantial evidence, the ultimate agency decision could still
268

Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶¶ 10–27, 188 P.3d 554, 557– 62 (Wyo. 2008).

269

Id.

Id. The intimation in the reported case is that the wound was in fact suffered after Dale’s
fall. Id. A primary issue on appeal, however, was whether the factual findings by the Hearing Officer
took proper account of the claimant’s testimonial incoherence produced by prescription medication
during the first day of a two-day hearing. Id. The claimant alleged that the Hearing Officer’s failure
to explicitly factor in the medication when considering testimonial inconsistencies was arbitrary,
capricious and “fundamental error.” Id.
270

271

Id.

Id. The basis for the rejection was apparently the initial report of a “scrape” that was later
treated as a “wound.” Id.
272

273

Id.

274

Id.

Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 49 P.3d 163, 166–73
(Wyo. 2002).
275

276

Dale, ¶ 13, 188 P.3d at 559.

277

Id.
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be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other reasons. The
arbitrary or capricious standard works as a “safety net” to catch
agency action which prejudices a party’s substantial rights or
which may be contrary to the other WAPA review standards yet
is not easily categorized or fit to any one particular standard.278
The arbitrary and capricious standard has routinely been viewed as a
reasonableness catch-all provision in administrative law, a standard that applies
when, for example, the substantial evidence standard does not or cannot apply.279
For example, under the federal APA, substantial evidence review applies solely
“in a case subject to [APA] sections 556 and 557 . . . or otherwise reviewed on
the record of an agency hearing provided by statute.”280 The question arose in
the early 1970s as to the appropriate scope of judicial review of the record of
an agency hearing that was not required by statute.281 The answer provided by
the U.S. Supreme Court in Overton Park was that the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review applied in such circumstances.282 Because the substantial
evidence standard did not apply in that case, and because “the action of ‘each
authority of the Government of the United States,’ . . . is subject to judicial review
except where there is a statutory prohibition on review or where ‘agency action is
committed to agency discretion by law,’ exceptions that did not apply to the case,
the Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard:
In all cases, agency action must be set aside if the action was
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law” or if the action failed to meet statutory,
procedural, or constitutional requirements. 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)
(A), (B), (C), (D) . . . In certain narrow, specifically limited
situations, the agency action is to be set aside if the action was
not supported by “substantial evidence.”283
Thus, administrative law authority at times has articulated “substantial
evidence” as a more specific subset of the general requirement that agency
action not be arbitrary.284 While the Newman court opined that the arbitrary
278

Newman, 49 P.3d at 172 (internal citations omitted).

279

Id.

280

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012).

See Gordon G. Young, Judicial Review of Informal Agency Action on the Fiftieth Anniversary
of the APA: The Alleged Demise and Actual Status of Overton Park’s Requirement of Judicial Review “On
the Record,” 10 Admin L. J. Am. U. 179, 181– 83 (1996) (describing judicial review of informal
adjudication in period leading up to Overton Park).
281

282

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

283

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1971).

Of course, the arbitrary and capricious standard applies more broadly to all administrative
agency decision making, and requires rational connections between facts found and policy choices
agencies eventually decided upon. See Louis J. Virelli III, Deconstructing Arbitrary and Capricious
284
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and capricious standard was more lenient and deferential to agencies than the
substantial evidence standard,285 an opinion not disputed by the Dale Court,286
the federal authorities are not in universal agreement. As discussed recently by a
Minnesota state court:
For questions of fact, the federal APA’s arbitrary or capricious
standard and substantial evidence standard are widely understood
to be very similar, and perhaps identical. See Ass’n of Data
Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. (ADAPSO), 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Scalia,
J.) (“[I]n their application to the requirement of factual support
the substantial evidence test and the arbitrary or capricious test
are one and the same. The former is only a specific application of
the latter . . . [T]he distinction between the substantial evidence
test and the arbitrary or capricious test is ‘largely semantic[.]’”)
(quoting Aircraft Owners and Pilots Ass’n v. FAA, 600 F.2d 965,
971 n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1979)).287
In light of the catch-all theory of arbitrary and capricious review, it is perhaps
not surprising that some Wyoming courts began to hold that whenever a hearing
officer found a claimant “failed to meet his burden of proof, the arbitrary and
capricious standard applie[d].”288 However, the Dale Court found that this
erroneous proposition derived from a misreading of a prior case in which a
hearing officer had made an incorrect ruling of law.289 For the Court, the case had
been read, wrongly, as if it had established a separate evidentiary review standard,
for ultimately the substantial evidence standard continued to apply.290 The Court,
of course, acknowledged that in the case of federal “informal” adjudications, the
Review, 92 N.C. L. Rev. 721, 785 (2014) (arguing that courts and scholars have neglected
extended discussion of the routine application of arbitrary and capricious review across all phases of
administrative agency decision making).
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 49 P.3d 163, 170
(Wyo. 2002).
285

286

Dale v. S & S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 13, 188 P.3d 554, 559 (Wyo. 2008).

In re Application of Minn. Power for Authority to Increase Rates for Elec. Serv. in Minn.,
838 N.W.2d 747, 766 (Minn. 2013) (Anderson, J., concurring).
287

288
Dale, ¶ 17, 188 P.3d at 560. The Dale court viewed this as a misreading of Boyce v. State
ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 9, ¶ 6, 105 P.3d 451, 454 (Wyo. 2005). Id.
289

Id.

Id. at ¶ 18, 188 P.3d at 560 (citing State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div. v.
Slaymaker, 2007 WY 65, 156 P.3d 977 (Wyo. 2007); Spletzer v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 90, 116 P.3d 1103 (Wyo. 2005); Taylor v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’
Safety & Comp. Div., 2005 WY 148, 123 P.3d 143 (Wyo. 2005) (referring to both the substantial
evidence and arbitrary and capricious standards of review); David v. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp.
Div., 2007 WY 22, 151 P.3d 280 (Wyo. 2007) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard because
the hearing examiner ruled the claimant had not met his burden of proof )).
290
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substantial evidence standard did not apply, but that exception did not establish
some new rule.291
Remarkably, even after reciting Newman’s inclusion of both the “overwhelming weight” and “substantial evidence” standards together in the same
paragraph,292 Dale failed to discuss in detail the meaning of substantial evidence.293
The omission seems remarkable because the case represented a fundamental
attempt to harmonize various judicial review provisions pertaining to administrative action. The case seemed to provide a golden opportunity for a broad
discussion of substantial evidence; a hearing officer appeared to base a decision
on testimony that had been influenced by ingestion of prescription drugs.294
The hearing official, obviously concerned about the ingestion, recessed the first
day of hearing.295 The ultimate decision, while based on some evidence, was also
based on questionable evidence.296 The Wyoming Supreme Court addressed
the same implicit question in Dale as in Moss: may a court decline to uphold a
decision because it offends the court’s conscience, or must courts in all instances
uphold agency decisions that are not clearly contrary to the overwhelming
weight of the evidence.297 In light of the “overwhelming weight” standard it was
not surprising that the claimant in Dale attempted to rely on the arbitrary and
capricious standard.
Also remarkable was Dale’s relatively sparse treatment of the legislative history
surrounding the Wyoming APA. The Court first stated:
Id. at ¶ 20, 188 P.3d at 560 (citing Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971)); see supra note 244 and accompanying text.
291

292

Dale, ¶ 11, 188 P.3d at 558–59 (citing Newman, 49 P.3d at 168, 173).

The Dale court’s argument that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) provides only one
evidentiary standard of review is confusing. See id. at ¶ 21, 188 P.3d at 561. Arbitrary and capricious
review has obviously been pressed into service in connection with 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A), which
is virtually the mirror image of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A). See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A)
(2012); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) (2017).
293

294

Dale, ¶ 29, 188 P.3d at 562:
At the conclusion of Mr. Dale’s direct testimony, the hearing examiner expressed
concern about his ability to continue with the hearing. The hearing examiner
remarked that he “became concerned about halfway through Mr. Dale’s testimony”
that Mr. Dale’s pain was making him unable “to adequately proceed and testify in
this matter.” He expressed concern that Mr. Dale would not be able to accurately
answer questions. All of the parties agreed with the hearing examiner, and the
hearing was continued until June 14, 2006.

295

Id. at ¶ 2, 188 P.3d at 557.

Testimonial discrepancies between a first hearing, when the claimant was incapacitated
while testifying, and a second hearing, when he was not, formed part of the rationale for the judge’s
discrediting of the claimant. See supra note 289 and accompanying text. The mere recital of these
facts underscores the problematic nature of the evidence.
296

The court somewhat irrelevantly chided the claimant for failing to object to introduction
of the first day’s testimony. Dale, ¶ 33, 188 P.3d at 562–63. The issue was not the introduction of
the testimony, but the manner in which it was used. Id.
297
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Under the plain language of the statute, reversal of an agency
finding or action is required if it is “not supported by substantial
evidence.” Because contested case hearings under Wyoming’s
Administrative Procedures Act, are formal, trial-type proceedings,
use of the substantial evidence standard for review of evidentiary
matters is more in keeping with the original intent of the drafters
of the administrative procedures [sic] act.298
This passage, while initially suggesting a plain language treatment of the issue
before the court, then appeals to “the original intent of the drafters” of the APA.299
Yet, rather than discussing legislative history reflecting the original intent of the
drafters, the Dale court cited to the federal treatise on administrative procedure,
Wright’s, Federal Practice and Procedure.300 While a respected authority, Wright’s
does not reveal the intent of the drafters of the Wyoming APA.301 The cited
passage is nevertheless instructive for other purposes:
The reasonableness instruction tells the court that it is not to
decide whether the agency found the one right answer—the
answer the judge would have given—or even to determine how
close the agency came to the one right answer; it requires only
that the court decide whether the agency has found an answer
which has a reasonable likelihood of being correct. After that,
the court’s function ends and it is the agency’s judgment, not the
court’s, which is controlling. Hence, the court must find that
the decision demonstrates “sound judgment”—not necessarily
correct judgment. Sound judgment, however, is a fairly sturdy
standard and the mere chance that the agency’s judgment is correct is
not enough. Reasonableness review demands that the probabilities
that the agency is correct be relatively high. Reasonableness review
requires the court to make the positive judgment that the
decision could be correct . . .302
The question is thus brought full circle. That an agency’s decision is not
“clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence” should give a court
little comfort that the agency has exercised “sound judgment” under a “fairly

298

Id. at ¶ 21, 188 P.3d at 561.

299

Id.

300

Id.

The author has been able to uncover nothing on the intent of the drafters in this regard,
though see supra note 258–267 and accompanying text (demonstrating contemporary discussants
appeared to have the Universal Camera variant of substantial evidence in mind).
301

Charles H. Koch, Jr. & Charles Alan Wright, 33 Fed. Prac. & Proc., Judicial Review
§ 8333 (2017).
302
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sturdy standard.” The overwhelming weight standard sounds much closer to a
standard upholding an agency on the “mere chance” that the agency is correct.

D. Closer Scrutiny of Dale & Newman
Dale provides additional insights into the development of the substantial
evidence standard in Wyoming. As the Dale majority noted,303 Newman had
reiterated a statement made in earlier Wyoming cases:
[T]he deference that normally is accorded the findings of fact by
a trial court is extended to the administrative agency, and we do
not adjust the decision of the agency unless it is clearly contrary
to the overwhelming weight of the evidence on record. This is so
because, in such an instance, the administrative body is the trier
of fact and has the duty to weigh the evidence and determine the
credibility of witnesses.304
The reader will first recall that a similar “trial court” review standard
had been applied in Missouri administrative law and had been interpreted as
requiring a court to uphold an agency decision if any evidence supported it.305
An amendment to the Missouri state constitution effectively required enhanced
judicial review under the substantial provision.306 The origin of the Wyoming
trial court deference standard appears to be Wyoming Steel & Fab., Inc. v. Robles.307
That case, in turn, cites for support of the relevant standard Mekss v. Wyoming
Girls School, State of Wyoming,308 and Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Division
v. Brown,309 but neither of those cases state that “the deference that normally is
accorded the findings of fact by a trial court is extended to the administrative
agency.”310 This is important because some Wyoming cases had held in the era
of Robles, “[t]he findings of the trial court are affirmed if there is any evidence to

303

Dale, ¶ 11, 188 P.3d at 558–59.

Id. (citing Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 49 P.3d 163, 173
(Wyo. 2002)).
304

305
See supra note 230 and accompanying text. A Missouri constitutional amendment subse
quently enlarged and made less deferential the scope of judicial review with respect to substantial
evidence. Id.
306

Id.

307

Wyo. Steel & Fab, Inc. v. Robles, 882 P.2d 873 (Wyo. 1994).

Mekss v. Wyo. Girls Sch., 813 P.2d 185 (Wyo. 1991), cert. sought and denied on other
grounds, 502 U.S. 1032 (1992).
308

309

State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Comp. Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830 (Wyo. 1991).

Each case does, however, recite the “overwhelming weight” standard and creates some
investigative suspicion that the courts reviewed the standards as closely related. See Mekss, 813 P.2d
at 201; Brown, 805 P.2d at 833.
310
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support them.”311 In context, it is quite possible that some Wyoming courts were
applying the “overwhelming weight” as an “any evidence” standard.
Newman also recounted that the Wyoming APA “initially did not address how
the record should be considered in the conduct of judicial review.”312 However, as
Newman further explains:
This [judicial review] subsection was amended, effective May
25, 1979, to require agency action, findings and conclusions to
be supported by substantial evidence, but also to provide for a
review of the “whole record.” Under this standard, we do not
examine the record only to determine if there is substantial
evidence to support the Board’s decision, but we must also
examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the Board
could reasonably have made its findings and order upon all of
the evidence before it. After reviewing the history and rationale
in changing the “substantial evidence” rule in the Wagner Act
to the “whole record” provision of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (similar to present provisions of s 9-4-114(c)), the
consideration is stated in Universal Camera Corp. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465,
95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), and quoted in National Labor Relations
Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 405,
82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962) . . .313
The passage from Newman above, quoted verbatim from the court’s earlier
opinion in Board of Trustees of School District No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell,
establishes that the 1979 amendment to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure
Act effectively superseded Spiegel ’s “overwhelming weight” formulation, whether
or not the Spiegel standard was erroneously adopted.314 It is very difficult to read
the language as other than an interpretation equating “whole record” review in
Wyoming to the kind of “conscientious” review motivating Universal Camera and
its progeny.315

Capshaw v. Schieck, 44 P.3d 47, 55 (Wyo. 2002); Bowker v. Bowker, 795 P.2d 1215, 1218
(Wyo. 1990); Pine Creek Canal No. 1 v. Stadler, 685 P.2d 13, 19 (Wyo. 1984).
311

Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 49 P.3d 163, 172 (Wyo.
2002) (citing 1965 Wyo. Sess. Laws 131– 40; Dubois Tel. Exch. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.,
429 P.2d 812, 816 n.1 (Wyo. 1967)).
312

313

Newman, 49 P.3d at 173 (quoting Bd. of Trs. v. Colwell, 611 P.2d 427, 429 (Wyo. 1980)).

The reader may recall that Spiegel was decided in 1976. See Bd. of Trs. v. Spiegel, 549 P.2d
1161 (Wyo. 1976).
314

315

See supra notes 129– 49 and accompanying text.
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E. Revisiting Moss
Conscientious, whole-record review would allow Wyoming courts the
professional independence to decline to uphold workers’ compensation
administrative decisions where the record indicates that an agency “disregarded
relevant evidence, made incorrect assumptions about other evidence and, rather
than considering the evidence fairly and objectively, generally viewed it in the
light most likely to result in a denial of benefits.”316 Any administrative system
that would allow such an outcome must be adjusted. In Moss, the Wyoming
Supreme Court determined that, despite clear evidence of biased fact-finding, it
was obligated to find for the Division because the administrative decision was not
clearly contrary to the “overwhelming weight of the evidence.”317 Moss, however,
had “a laminectomy at L5–S1 and an L4–S1 fusion with a hip graft and hardware
installation.”318 Furthermore:
Mr. Moss became ill after the surgery. Thinking the hardware
might be the cause, Dr. Neal performed another surgery in
October 2004 to remove the hardware. Mr. Moss continued
to have pain and Dr. Neal referred him to a pain management
clinic where he was seen by Dr. Kyle Matsumura. From 2005
through the hearing date, Dr. Matsumura treated Mr. Moss on a
regular basis for pain by injection, neurotomy [cutting of nerves]
and prescription narcotics . . .
In the course of treatment after the lumbar fusion, several
doctors concluded that the fusion had failed. In 2007, Dr.
Neal recommended that Mr. Moss undergo a revision fusion.
Mr. Moss decided against the procedure because there was no
guarantee it would result in a successful fusion, resolve his pain
or increase his functional capacity.319
All of these required medical procedures were obviously work-related, so the
only question was the extent of Moss’s disability.320 Although he had a theoretical
work capacity, Moss’s treating doctor said he was permanently disabled.321 The
Medical Commission attempted to discredit Moss’s reports of pain and his

316

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.

Moss v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2010 WY 66, ¶ 43, 232 P.3d 1,
12 (Wyo. 2010).
317

318

Id. at ¶ 4, 232 P.3d at 3.

319

Id.

320

Id. at ¶¶ 12–21, 232 P.3d at 5– 6.

321

Id. at ¶ 4, 232 P.3d at 3.
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treating doctor’s opinion as to his total disability, utilizing methods the entire
Court obviously concluded were deeply objectionable.322
Nevertheless, the Court concluded it was required to uphold the Division’s
finding that Moss was not entitled to benefits under the odd lot doctrine because
the Court could not “conclude that the Medical Commission’s ruling was against
the overwhelming weight of the evidence.”323 It is unlikely that a reasonable mind
could accept this outcome. Leaving to one side that the administrative actors
committed an error of law, not fact, in misapplying the odd lot doctrine; and
dispensing with the view that the Medical Commission need not be afforded
deference in passing on the bona fides of an employee’s work search,324 the factual
support for the agency’s position consisted of three physicians refuting Moss’s
claim that he could not perform light duty work.325 The issue was not whether,
under ordinary circumstances, an administrative agency’s reliance on this kind of
testimony would be subject to scrutiny.326 The issue was whether the Division’s
decision could be conscientiously upheld by any court given the circumstances of
the case. In dissent, Justice Hill had the better view:
I would reject the Medical Commission’s determination that
there is work available that is within Moss’s physical limitations
(which, of course, includes the facts that he is walking around
with what is essentially a broken back, the level of pain that he
experiences almost constantly, and the anxiety and depression
that is ancillary to that pain, and his inability to “work” and earn
a living). The evidence offered by the Division was not the sort
of evidence that “a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” The majority has already rejected most
of the Medical Commission’s findings that negatively impacted
Moss’s case. That circumstance leads me to view with distrust
this final finding made by the Commission, which now must
bear the entire weight of the final decision to deny Moss the
benefits at issue here.327

322

Id. at ¶¶ 28 –37, 232 P.3d at 9–11.

323

Id. at ¶ 43, 232 P.3d at 12.

324

See supra notes 181–211 and accompanying text.

Moss, ¶¶ 53–54, 232 P.3d at 16 (Hill, W., dissenting). There was much in the record to
discredit these witnesses, though that is not legally determinative. See id.
325

See Hayes v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2013 WY 96, ¶ 16, 307
P.3d 843, 849 (Wyo. 2013) (“When conflicting medical opinions are presented at the contested
case hearing, the agency has the responsibility, as the trier of fact, to determine relevancy, assign
probative value, and ascribe the relevant weight given to the evidence presented.”).
326

327

Moss, ¶ 48, 232 P.3d at 14.
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Justice Hill, in short, applied the actual substantial evidence rule.328 In
context,329 it is difficult to escape the impression that the shackles imposed
by an unnecessarily potent overwhelming weight standard authorized a man
with a “broken back”330 being sent back out into his post-injury life with
$7,123.97.331 Wyoming law does not require such a result and Wyoming policy
should disclaim it.
328

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

329

As Justice Hill chronicled:
“The Division has brought to bear an unusually large cadre of experts in its attempt
to dispute Moss’s claims, and the evidence provided by his treating physicians
(claims of chronic, debilitating pain, anxiety and depression, and what amounts to
a broken back). Both the Medical Commission, and the Division’s experts, relied on
some surreptitious video-taping of Moss’s activities (although the snippets of film
shed light on less than an hour’s worth of Moss’s life). The Medical Commission,
and at least one of the experts hired by the Division, misused that evidence to a
degree that can only be considered maliciously irresponsible. For instance, at the
top of page 16 of its findings . . ., the Commission interpreted a piece of the film
as showing Moss ‘sprinting up a flight of stairs at his home.’ Moss did not ‘sprint,’
although he moved at a brisk walk, but there were only two steps involved, from
his yard to a small porch that led to the door of his mobile home. Moss is said
to repeatedly bend, stoop and squat in the video, when in fact he bends slightly
forward a few times, apparently to pick up small pieces of debris from the area
he is watering with a hose. It was contended that Moss picked up a heavy piece
of material (plywood?) and lifted it with ease onto an outbuilding. Moss brought
that item to the hearing and it was a piece of tin that he slid onto the roof of the
building, from a relatively low height, using the overhang of the roof as a weight
bearing surface and then sliding the 8 pound piece of tin onto the roof. Even a
superficial review of the video surveillance evidence mandates a conclusion that it
did nothing to support the Medical Commission’s findings or the findings made
in the IME reports. On the contrary, the credit given that evidence by the Medical
Commission calls into question the fact-finding capacity of the Commission and
its experts . . . In addition to ignoring the SSA determination, and crediting the
surveillance video as supporting findings that it simply cannot support, I add the
following examples wherein the Medical Commission played loose and fast with
the facts: (1) See pages 3–4, ¶ 4; wherein the Commission blames Moss’s injury on
a congenital condition, as well as on his failure to observe his pre–2003 work effort
restrictions (now that his condition has worsened considerably, the Commission
contends he is more physically capable . . . than he was before the 2003 injuries
and the failed surgery with hardware removal); (2) throughout its findings the
Medical Commission refers to exhibits which cannot be located using its citations
to the record; (3) In ¶ 15, pp. 6–7, fn. 1, the Medical Commission notes that
Moss ‘has not submitted any evidence that his impairment rating of 23% was in
error.’ When, in fact, that is what this case is all about (Moss’s condition steadily
deteriorated after the date of that determination).”

Moss, ¶ 51, 232 P.3d at 15.
330

Id. at ¶ 48, 232 P.3d at 14.

Id. at ¶ 7, 232 P.3d at 3. It is not clear from the reported case whether this figure represented
a permanent partial impairment or a permanent partial disability benefit. See Wyo. Stat. Ann.
§§ 27-14-405(g)–(h). The distinction, which is a unique creature of Wyoming law, is not
important here.
331
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VI. Conclusion
The Wyoming Supreme Court should find its way back to the path laid out
in Colwell.332 The court should, in all cases, “examine the conflicting evidence
to determine if [an agency] could reasonably have made its findings and order
upon all of the evidence before it.” The court should reemphasize that the
Wyoming legislature’s 1979 amendment of the Wyoming Administrative
Procedure Act explicitly linked “substantial evidence” to whole-record review of
the kind established by Universal Camera.333 The best course would be for the
court to simply overrule Spiegel,334 and the “overwhelming weight” standard it
mistakenly initiated.335
In the event the court declines to overrule Spiegel, it should make
unambiguously clear that there is absolutely no difference between the
overwhelming weight and substantial evidence standard. Alternatively, to the
extent that the overwhelming weight standard means something different
than “substantial evidence,” the court should explain both what the overwhelming weight standard means, and how it relates to the substantial
evidence standard.
It is axiomatic that courts should not simply substitute their judgment for
that of administrative agencies implementing statutes within the realm of the
agencies’ expertise.336 But Universal Camera, as agreed with by Colwell,337 made
clear that “a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside [an agency] decision
when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision
is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes,
including the body of evidence opposed to the [agency’s] view.”338 Because the
overwhelming weight standard frustrates that bedrock principle of administrative
law, it should be abandoned.

332

Bd. of Trs. v. Colwell, 611 P.2d 427, 429 (Wyo. 1980).

333

Id.

334

See supra note 62 and accompanying text.

335

See supra notes 44–113 and accompanying text.

336

Colwell, 611 P.2d at 428.

337

Id.

338

Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).
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